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I. INTRODUCTION
Most have heard the adage: "The squeaky wheel gets the grease." This
refers to the notion that the "squeaky wheels" -who are proactive in
pursuing their needs and complaints-are most likely to get the assistance,
remedies, and other benefits they seek. However, those who remain silent
usually do not learn about or receive the same benefits. Furthermore, the
individuals with the requisite resources to pursue their interests are often
those who already enjoy disproportionate power due to social or economic
status.' This dynamic-which this Article will refer to as the "squeaky
wheel system" (SWS)-dominates the workplace and marketplace.2
The SWS thrives in debt, insurance, and other business-to-consumer
(B2C) contexts. Although creditors are notoriously squeaky wheels in
pursuing payment from debtors, debtors also must become squeaky wheels
to obtain fee waivers and interest rate deductions that lenders reserve for
only the most high-value and persistent customers. Furthermore,
individuals must be persistent to obtain compensation on insurance claims
due to insurers' "rationing by hassle" through delay-and-ignore tactics. In
addition, merchants may ration remedies and cut costs by using the SWS to
limit remedies for purchase complaints.5 They know that relatively few
consumers are aware of available remedies, and even fewer seek assistance.6
1. See infra Part II.B.2.
2. Of course, "squeaky wheel" is not my term, and others have referred to the general dynamic
in the workplace as the "squeaky wheel system." See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103, 132-35 (2000). However, this system is rarely
discussed in consumer contexts, and I am using SWS for ease of reference.
3. See Unique Envelope Corp. v. GS Am., Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 643, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(noting a debtor's testimony regarding the need to pay "the next squeaky wheel" creditor); Eide v.
Nat'l City Capital Corp. (In re Riversideworld, Inc.), 366 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2007)
(discussing the debtor in financial trouble paying only the squeaky wheels); Matthew T. Smith,
Being the Squeaky Wheel: A Proactive Approach to Representing Creditors in Chapter 11
Litigation, in CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 11 CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE
REORGANIZATION PROCESS, EXERCISING CREDITORS' RIGHTS, AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT
OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 109-29 (Aspatore 2009) (highlighting the importance of "being the
squeaky wheel" in the bankruptcy process as a means for getting paid on debts).
4. See Richard Lewis, Property Insurance 101, in INSURANCE LAW 2006: UNDERSTANDING
THE ABC'S, at 61, 100 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 741, 2006) (noting
the need to be a "squeaky wheel" in order to get paid on insurance claims due to insurance
companies' "rationing by hassle").
5. See Arthur Best & Alan R. Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A
Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints, and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
701, 702 (1977) (noting that sellers choose to use "less stringent quality control practices" and
simply compensate those that complain about defective products).
6. Id. at 711-12 (finding that only 39.7% of consumers who experience purchase problems
complain to the company, report it to a third party, or take any sort of action).
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Furthermore, out of the consumers who take any action, only a very small
handful have the requisite confidence and resources to become squeaky
wheels who capture businesses' attention and obtain remedies.
Through this SWS rationing, businesses may maximize their profits
while eluding legitimate complaints and perpetuating a system of status-
based treatment. They may control public information by quieting the
squeaky wheel consumers and perhaps hiding health and safety information
regarding their products.9 Companies also may use the SWS to capitalize on
continued freedom to impose fees and one-sided contract terms on the
consumer masses that remain uninformed about their rights or the
availability of benefits.o The SWS can effectively prevent the minority of
informed consumers from spreading information to others about products
and other purchase problems."
This means that economists' proposed "informed minority" fails to
police the fairness of contract terms and business practices.12  Economists
posit that regardless of whether most consumers ignore contract terms, a
minority of consumers will police fairness for the good of all consumers by
notifying others of unfair practices and threatening to go elsewhere if
companies do not make appropriate changes.13  This theory, however, is
based on questionable assumptions and unfounded facts. 14
7. See infra Part II.B. Admittedly, it is unclear how persistent a consumer must be to become a
squeaky wheel who is likely to obtain what he seeks. This will depend on company policies and
norms in a given context. Nonetheless, the squeaky wheels discussed in this Article are generally
individuals who are proactive in asserting their needs and who will persist in seeking assistance
despite an initial denial.
8. See, e.g., R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability of an
Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 635, 672-76 (1996)
(discussing how sellers differentiate among buyers by providing contract changes and adjustments to
only the most sophisticated consumers who complain).
9. See Trouble with Recalls, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2011, at 14 (highlighting 2010 survey
findings indicating that "[o]nly a fifth of U.S. adults were aware of having purchased food,
medication, or a product (other than a car) that was recalled in the past three years," and the reasons
for this lack of information).
10. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674-75 (noting that with respect to latent defects not
covered by pro-seller warranty terms, sellers often provide repairs for complaining customers to stop
them from creating "bad will for sellers," while they continue to deny such repairs for the
"uninformed masses who simply bear the loss").
11. See discussion infra Part III.A.
12. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 647-50 (explaining and questioning the informed
minority argument); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of
Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 700, 714-16 (1992) (explaining
the informed minority argument through a discussion of the "marginal set of informed consumers").
13. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630, 637-39 (1979) ("Thus, if
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As an initial matter, there is no evidence that a sufficient number of
"informed" consumers read or shop for purchase terms beyond price and a
few other provisions particular to their needs.'5 Furthermore, even if some
level of informed minority exists, only a handful of the consumers in this
group pursue contract complaints.16  In addition, the members of the
informed minority who obtain assistance through their persistence have little
to no incentive to share information about rationed benefits with the
uninformed masses who subsidize the SWS through their inaction. 7
Businesses know they generally can quiet the informed squeaky wheels by
giving them "special" assistance and emphasizing the businesses' inability to
provide everyone with these benefits.' 8  This, in turn, perpetuates the SWS
and businesses' manipulation of contract terms and dispute resolution.' 9
These SWS dynamics highlight the importance of what I have termed
the consumer "contracting culture." 20  This conception of culture goes
beyond common notions of culture based on ethnicity, and encompasses
broad contextual economic and non-economic factors that affect parties'
bargaining powers and contracting behaviors. 21 For example, the B2C
contracting culture is generally more "extra-communal" than business-to-
business (B2B) contexts because consumers usually do not share bargaining
enough searchers exist, firms have incentives both to compete for their business and to offer the
same terms to nonsearchers. When the preferences of searchers are positively correlated with the
preferences of nonsearchers, competition among firms for searchers should tend to protect all
consumers.").
14. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 664-76 (concluding that the informed minority argument
is based on faulty assumptions).
15. See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics
Approach to Standard Form Contracts 1-26 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1443256 (studying the Internet
browsing of 45,091 households and finding that only one or two in 1000 shoppers studied online
software merchants or accessed their websites). Even proactive shoppers usually focus on only price
and a few other terms particular to their needs. LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT
THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND INTERPRETATION 28-30 (2007).
16. See infra Part III.A.
17. See infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
18. See Peter A. Alces & Jason M. Hopkins, Carrying a Good Joke Too Far, 83 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 879, 895-97 (2008) (discussing how businesses may discriminate in favor of sophisticated
consumers by reducing fees and foregoing enforcement of terms in their form agreements that are
otherwise "prejudicial to customer interests").
19. See id
20. See Amy J. Schmitz, Consideration of "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing Arbitration
Provisions, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 123 (2007).
21. See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REv.
511 (2009) (tracing ways to use culture as means for infusing law into societal consciousness); John
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use ofSocial Science Research, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 571
(1991) (discussing the application of social science and empirical research in the law); Jeffrey Z.
Rubin & Frank E.A. Sander, Culture, Negotiation, and the Eye of the Beholder, 7 NEGOTIATION J.
249, 250-53 (1991) (highlighting the importance of cultural differences relating to ethnicity or
nationality, and recognizing similar differences due to race, gender, and age).
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power, experience, and understandings with businesses that draft form
contracts.22 In contrast, parties to more "intra-communal" B2B transactions
often share relatively equal bargaining power and contract experience.23
The SWS is less problematic in "intra" versus "extra" communal
contexts because parties in intra-communal transactions usually have less
ability to control the SWS to ration information and remedies. For example,
contractors and subcontractors in B2B construction transactions usually
understand their rights at the outset because they use accepted industry
contracts.24 In addition, trade organizations provide strong means and
incentives for sharing information, thereby creating an informed majority to
help police the fairness of business practices.2 ' This largely alleviates the
need for public regulations to address the problematic effects of the SWS in
these intra-communal-as opposed to extra-communal-contexts.
In contrast, the lack of shared contract understandings and power fuels
the force of the SWS in B2C exchanges.26 This system allows businesses to
ration remedies and discriminate in favor of sophisticated squeaky wheel
consumers with the requisite information and resources to protect their
interests and pursue purchase complaints. 27 All consumers then shoulder the
passed-on costs of appeasing these squeaky wheels, regardless of whether
their complaints are legitimate.2 ' Furthermore, the consumers with the least
power and resources withstand the worst of these costs and rarely know
about, let alone enjoy, the rationed benefits. In summary, this creates a
need for consumer protections that the broken market has failed to provide.30
This Article uncovers the salience of the SWS in B2C exchanges, and
explores its impacts on contract regulation and purchase practices in the
consumer marketplace. Part II discusses companies' impetus to appease
squeaky wheels, as well as the behavioral, practical, and social factors that
22. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 20, at 123-35 (explaining my contracting culture spectrum
analysis).
23. See id. at 158 (describing the commercial construction context as an example of intra-
communal B2B transactions).
24. See, e.g., id. at 156-57 (noting that the Associated General Contractors of America's Short
Form is a "typical standard form construction contract").
25. See, e.g., id. at 155-58 (discussing use by a prominent trade organization, the American
Institute for Architects (AIA), of form contracts requiring dispute resolution that allows parties to
manage their reputations and resolve disputes).
26. See infra Part II.B.
27. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part IV.B.
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affect consumers' likelihood and ability to pursue complaints and remedies.
It also provides a snapshot of empirical data from my e-survey of Colorado
consumers that is relevant to SWS dynamics. Part III then discusses
consequences of the SWS with respect to B2C practices, leading to Part IV's
proposal for proportional and efficient means for consumers to access
purchase information and contract remedies. Part V concludes with a call
for further development of such remedy mechanisms aimed to diffuse the
SWS, narrow the divide between the consumer "haves" and "have-nots,"
and foster better regulation of the fairness of companies' contract and claims
assistance practices.
II. CONVERGING FORCES FAVORING SQUEAKY WHEELS
We learn from an early age that it is wise to be persistent in a world
where "sometimes only 'the squeaky wheel gets the grease."' 3 1 For the most
part, this fosters efficient allocation of assets to those who value them most
and appropriately rewards individuals for expending resources to pursue
their needs.32 Nonetheless, companies' profit incentives and consumers'
behavioral tendencies often converge to allow the SWS to curb consumer
rights and foster favoritism for those with the most resources and power."
A. Companies'Impetus to Grease the Wheels
Dominant forces push companies to change contract terms ex ante, and
to provide purchase remedies ex post to only the squeaky wheels or to those
who ask for assistance or complain the loudest.34 Furthermore, companies
with tight budgets in this tough economy may ration their assistance to the
consumers who have the requisite resources to make more and larger
purchases to the disadvantage of those with the least resources. These
business propensities then converge with individual behavioral tendencies
and biases to foster companies' manipulations of the SWS and widen the
divide between the informed minority and uninformed majority of
consumers.3
5
31. ROBERTO ARON ET AL., TRIAL COMMUNICATION SKILLS § 34.24 (2d ed. 1996). See also
Marsh Buggies, Inc. v. Weems Geophysical, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98-2767, 1999 WL 638592, at *2
(E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1999) ("[T]he notion that the squeaky wheel gets the oil is as applicable at the
end of the twentieth century as it was at the end of the nineteenth.").
32. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 673-75 (discussing benefits received by customers who
are invested and informed).
33. See infra Parts II.A-II.B.3.
34. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674 (discussing companies changing contract terms for
well-informed and outspoken customers).
35. See id. at 674-75.
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1. Prevailing Reasons for Appeasing Complainers
The SWS has become familiar in the workplace, especially in
low- information environments in which employees "in the know" reap all
the available benefits." For example, some law faculties operate on a SWS
to the extent that school deans ration special research and travel funding to
only those who are aware of, and therefore become persistent in seeking,
such benefits." Furthermore, risk-averse employees generally lose out in
the SWS because they fear repercussions of asking for benefits or
complaining about work conditions. They may remain quiet due to fear
that asking would appear greedy or uncooperative, which could jeopardize
their jobs and reputations.39 Companies also may foster this dynamic by
strategically informing favored or "insider" employees regarding available
benefits to the detriment of those who lack this inside information.40
Such SWS dynamics are also alive and well in the low-information
environment of B2C exchanges. Merchants generally assist and focus their
attention on only those consumers that proactively pursue their complaints
and contract needs. 4' They may "grease" the squeaky wheel consumers to
retain them as customers and prevent them from informing other consumers
about purchase problems.42 Furthermore, sellers know that consumers will
complain to them before bringing their complaints to third parties such as
the Better Business Bureau (BBB) or the courts, and therefore may use the
SWS to monopolize complaint resolution to their benefit.43  This allows
businesses to avoid providing redress or making consumer-friendly contract
36. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 132-35 (explaining the "squeaky wheel system" in
the employment context in particular).
37. Laura T. Kessler, Paid Family Leave in American Law Schools: Findings and Open
Questions, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 661, 676-77 (2006) (highlighting how this can harm women in seeking
paid family leave).
38. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 132-35. Workers may be especially risk-averse in
this poor economy due to fear of lay-offs.
39. See id at 132.
40. Id. at 133. See also Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB.
& EMP. L. 149, 213-15 (2005) (discussing how "management greases the squeaky wheel" in the
workplace, and explaining how this can promote positive feedback gathering initiatives where
employers encourage constructive criticism); Kessler, supra note 37.
41. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674-75.
42. Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 701, 727 (noting study findings showing that satisfaction
rates for complaint resolution for frequently purchased products were higher than those for
infrequently purchased goods, although rates for products generally were higher than those for
services).
43. Id. at 713-15 (highlighting how few consumers bring complaints to third parties such as the
BBB or the courts, and companies' "monopoly on complaint handling").
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or policy changes with respect to the masses who fail to voice their
complaints.44 In this way, businesses may manage their reputations, ration
benefits, limit liability, and boost profits.45
Businesses understand that most consumers do not exert the time and
energy necessary to pursue their purchase complaints. Research indicates
that only 20.1% of frequently purchased products and 20.9% of services
generate formal consumer complaints, but that this is only the "tip-of-the-
iceberg" to the extent that many consumers, especially those of lower
socioeconomic status, do not realize their rights to complain.46 Furthermore,
"buyers suppress complaints concerning about two-thirds of the problems
they perceive," and a very small percentage of the one-third that take any
action persistently assert their complaints or report them to third parties.47
Businesses therefore may ration remedies by assisting only the few
persistent complainers.48
At the same time, businesses focus on persistent customers in order to
get the "most bang for their buck."49 Businesses get more mileage out of
"wowing" current customers by providing special assistance or making
exceptions, than expending resources to attract new customers.so It is
roughly five times harder to attract new customers than to retain current
ones, and businesses "can increase profits by 25 to 85 percent merely by
retaining 5 percent more of [their] current customers." 1 Studies also show
that customers who obtain satisfactory resolution of their complaints are
more loyal to a business than customers who never experience disputes.52
Furthermore, appeased complainers are more apt than others to
recommend a business to friends and family.53 However, customers who are
not satisfied with resolution of their complaints are likely to both leave and
denounce that business. One complaining consumer is likely to share his or
44. Id. at 716-20.
45. Id. at 721-22.
46. Id. at 701-08 (reporting study results and highlighting significant differences in problem
perception rates based on socioeconomic status and race).
47. Id. at 709-12, 727-30 (providing study results regarding consumers' responses to perceived
problems by purchase categories).
48. Id. at 702-03.
49. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674-75 (noting that sellers will address complainers'
concerns out of fear that the complainers will create bad will for them).
50. WOLF J. RINKE, DON'T OIL THE SQUEAKY WHEEL: AND 19 OTHER CONTRARIAN WAYS TO
IMPROVE YOUR LEADERSHIP EFFECTIVENESS 133-38 (2004) (discussing the importance of the
"wow" factor in providing customer assistance, even if it comes only in the wake of complaints).
51. Id (providing business leadership advice).
52. Lenden Webb, Brainstorming Meets Online Dispute Resolution, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
337, 357-58 (2004) (citing studies). See also Tibbett L. Speer, They Complain Because They Care,
AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, May 1996, at 13 (discussing how "grousers are likely to remain loyal" and
recommend a retailer to others if the retailer is attentive to their complaints).
53. See RINKE, supra note 50, at 136-38; Speer, supra note 52, at 13.
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her negative experiences with roughly twenty-one others. 54 Moreover, the
Internet allows unhappy customers to tell scores of others about their
experiences by posting negative comments on blogs and online social
networking websites." From this perspective, "the squeaky wheel is worth a
lot of grease."5 6
2. Tempered Reluctance to Relinquish Power
Dominant forces push companies to grease squeaky wheels who are
persistent in pursuing their purchase complaints." That said, businesses
have become less generous in heeding consumers' requests for changes to
B2C form terms, and many companies include unilateral amendment
provisions in their form contracts that hinder consumers' incentive to shop
for or negotiate form contracts. Consumers understandably see no reason
to negotiate terms ex ante knowing that companies can change the terms ex
post.59 Furthermore, companies' use of "shrouding" (through mass mailings
or confusing online presentations) to slip provisions into form contracts
further hinders consumers from noticing, let alone negotiating around,
onerous provisions.60
Consumers therefore voice powerlessness against merchants' form
contracts. For example, the consumers who participated in the focus groups
I held in Denver complained about their lack of power in consumer
purchases and their general distrust of merchants.6 1 Participants in the
groups also felt they had no choice but to accept form terms despite an
54. See RINKE, supra note 50, at 138.
55. See JANELLE BARLOW & CLAUS MOLLET, A COMPLAINT IS A GIFT 202-16 (2008) (noting
how customers now may post negative comments on the Internet to reach global audiences); PETE
BLACKSHAW, SATISFIED CUSTOMERS TELL THREE FRIENDS, ANGRY CUSTOMERS TELL 3,000, at 1-
10 (2008) (noting how an upset customer posted his recording of his negative experience seeking to
cancel AOL service on the Internet, thereby spreading his complaint to at least 62,827 others).
56. Webb, supra note 52, at 357-58.
57. See supra Part II.A.I.
58. See David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts,
80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 478-79 (2009) (highlighting how drafters have incentives to adhere to
form contract terms).
59. See Douglas v. U.S. Dist. Court, 495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding a unilateral change
provision in a cellular phone contract unenforceable); David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract
Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 648-52 (2010) (explaining the
inefficiency and anti-bargaining effects ofunilateral amendment provisions).
60. See Horton, supra note 59, at 649-57.
61. See Transcript, Consumer Focus Group in Denver, Colorado (Nov. 18, 2006) (unpublished
transcript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Focus Group Transcript]. Over the course of two days
in November 2006, I held three focus group discussions in Denver regarding contracting issues.
287
ostensible freedom to "shop around."62 One consumer lamented how she
felt trapped to accept a disclaimer of liability her dentist gave her
immediately before undergoing a major dental procedure. Other
consumers also recounted instances in which representatives told them that
form terms were not subject to any alteration, or salespersons said that they
lacked power to change company terms.
Many companies also have become stingier in providing ex post
purchase remedies to those that complain. One study found that only 56.5%
of consumers who voiced non-price complaints regarding their purchases
were satisfied with their complaints' resolutions.s Companies may ignore
consumers with legitimate complaints, and brush aside those customers they
view as less powerful or desirable. Some suggest that companies also have
cut back on customer assistance to help weather the economic downturn.66
It is nonetheless unwise to simply focus on squeaky wheels. 67  One
business leadership manual entitled Don't Oil the Squeaky Wheel warns that
employers may waste time and money seeking to appease whiners, while
neglecting the truly valuable, but quiet, employees. Similarly, businesses
busy placating complainers may assume erroneously that non-complainers
are content and will remain loyal customers. Studies suggest that only 4%
of unhappy customers provide feedback directly to the company, while 96%
of these customers silently take their business elsewhere.69 "Voting with the
feet is the American way."70 Unhappy customers also typically tell eight to
62. Id.
63. Id. (further explaining that her uncle had recommended the dentist to her, which helped her
trust his competence).
64. Id.
65. Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 726-27.
66. See Alana Semuels, Credit or Debit, Human?; Robots and Other Machines Are Increasingly
Edging Out People for Jobs in the Retail Sector, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2011, at Al (discussing
companies' use of automated systems instead of personal service); Businesses Balance Customer
Service With Job Cuts, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 30, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/
story/story.php?storyld=102492766 (noting how companies seeking to cut costs in this tough
economy have curbed customer service staff).
67. See Testa v. Town of Madison, No. Civ.04-185-B-W, 2005 WL 2365319, at *17 (D. Me.
Sept. 26, 2005), aff'd, Civ.04-185-B-W, 2005 WL 2864785 (D. Me. Nov. 1, 2005) (rejecting an
employee's claim that she was a protected whistleblower simply because she was "a squeaky wheel
[who] is supposed to get the grease"); Charles A. Edwards & Lovic A. Brooks, III, The "Squeaky
Wheel" Employee: To Grease or to Replace and the Costs of Each, 32 MERCER L. REV. 479 (1981)
(discussing employees' uses of squeaky wheel tactics to harass management).
68. RINKE, supra note 50, at 107-14 (focusing on pitfalls of appeasing "whiners," while
neglecting the highest performing employees and saddling the diligent, but quiet, workers with extra
burdens from accommodating the whiners who may never be satisfied).
69. See Jerry Plymire, Complaints as Opportunities, 5 J. SERVICES MARKETING 61 (1991)
(discussing a study conducted by T.A.R.P., a customer service research firm, and explaining why
customers rarely provide feedback directly to companies).
70. Id. at 63 (further explaining how and why companies should encourage complaints to assist
them in improving their practices and growing their customer bases).
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ten others about their negative experiences even if they had never voiced
their concerns to the company directly.
Merchants also may be reluctant to grease overly squeaky wheels who
excessively return or exchange purchased items.72 Some merchants
therefore oust, instead of grease, these customers by barring future returns.73
This is wise to the extent it combats improper consumer practices such as
return fraud, which cost retailers an estimated $9.6 billion in 2009 alone.
Companies seeking to establish enforcement of their form contracts also
may be reluctant to heed consumer complaints for fear they will waive
future insistence on those terms.
Some consumers complain, however, that this perpetuates high-pressure
sales and punishes consumers for helping to expose merchants' improper
practices. In addition, some businesses have transformed reluctance to
assist complaining consumers into a delay-and-hassle tactic for containing
costs and boosting profits.77  As mentioned above, some insurance
companies "ration by hassle" to limit their payments on insurance claims.
For example, some insurance companies have used "sweeping denials" and
71. Id. at 61-65. Other sources indicate that unhappy customers share their complaints with
eight to sixteen others. Janis Dietz, Keep the 'Silent Majority' Mum, MARKETING NEWS, Oct. 27,
1997, at 20 (highlighting the "silent majority" of dissatisfied customers that complain to friends but
not to the company directly).
72. See RICHARD K. MILLER & KELLI WASHINGTON, CONSUMER MARKETING 160-62 (2009)
(discussing how companies ban known "wardrobers" who buy products such as dresses for fancy
parties or televisions for the Super Bowl); Ariana Eunjung Cha, Some Shoppers Find Fewer Happy
Returns, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A30908-
2004Nov6 (noting the use of electronic monitoring to track excessive returns).
73. See, e.g., Cha, supra note 72 (explaining that due to excessive returns customers are
sometimes declined when they try to return items).
74. See Press Release, National Retail Federation, Retailers Find Balance as Return Policies
Assist Honest Shoppers, Fight Fraud (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://www.nrf.com/
modules.php?name=News&op-viewlive&sp id=814.
75. See Buffalo Molded Plastics, Inc. v. Omega Tool Corp. (In re Buffalo Molded Plastics, Inc.),
344 B.R. 394, 406 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006) (finding company could not rely on payment terms in the
applicable contract because they were not followed in the industry).
76. See, e.g., Stan Sutter, Editorial, When a Customer Is Wrong, MARKETING MAG., July 28,
2003, at 22 (commenting on the battle two sisters had with Filene's Basement after they were
banned for excessive returns).
77. See, e.g., infra note 79 and accompanying text.
78. See Lewis, supra note 4; see also supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text (recounting
consumer stories).
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"mad dog defense tactics" following catastrophes to limit liability and
prolong interest accruals on amounts owed to policyholders. 9
Lastly, even companies that are usually reluctant to assist consumers are
prone to assist the squeakiest wheels--often out of fear that these consumers
will bring claims or share negative stories with others.so Moreover, these
business practices converge with individuals' behavioral tendencies and
biases to allow companies to manipulate the SWS to their advantage.8 ' It
also works to advantage the most powerful and desirable consumers, thereby
fostering contractual discrimination and widening the gap between the
consumer "haves" and "have-nots."82
B. Factors Impacting Consumer Complaints
Most consumers have purchase complaints that they never assert against
a company, 3 especially when the consumers rely on the company for its
services.84 The data supports theories suggesting that behavioral tendencies,
socialization, and limited resources often work together to hinder
consumers' pursuit of complaints.5 Furthermore, empirical data from my
e-survey confirms that consumers lack information regarding their rights,
generally fail to protect their contract needs, and are relatively disinterested
in non-price contract terms.
79. See Kelsey D. Dulin, The Disaster After the Disaster: Insurance Companies' Post-
Catastrophe Claims Handling Practices, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 189, 196-201 (2008) (highlighting these
tactics and insurance companies' use of delay policies to capitalize on the time-value of money).
80. See Dietz, supra note 71, at 20 (highlighting the importance of appeasing complainers);
Speer, supra note 52, at 13 (noting how complaining customers are those most likely to remain loyal
and recommend a business to others if it satisfies the complaints).
81. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 672-76.
82. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 730.
83. See id. at 701 (noting how the complaints individuals voice are only the "tip-of-the-iceberg"
and "represent only a fraction of the problems they perceive concerning those purchases").
84. See Colette Thayer & Gerard Rainville, Consumer Financial Protection: Opinion of People
Aged 50+: State Surveys, AM. ASS'N RETIRED PEOPLE (AARP) (Apr. 2010),
http://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-04-2010/finprotectstates.html (reporting results of
studies in Arkansas, Indiana, Maine, South Dakota, and Wisconsin of individuals over fifty years old
regarding the need for reforms and consumer protections in the areas of investing, banking, and
lending). Recent surveys of individuals over fifty indicated overwhelming support for reforms and
protections with respect to investment firms, banks and lending practices. However, the surveys
used leading questions. For example, one question asked whether investment companies should be
required to disclose information "using plain language and a user-friendly format." Colette Thayer
& Chuck Rainville, Consumer Financial Protection: Opinion ofPeople Aged 50+ in Arkansas, AM.
ASs'N RETIRED PEOPLE (AARP) (Apr. 2010), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/consume/
finprotect ar.pdf.
85. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 710-15 (finding that only 39.7% of the consumers in
one study reported taking some kind of action with respect to purchase problems, and only 30.7% of
that group said they voiced their complaints to a seller).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 206-07.
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1. Inertia, Over-Optimism, and Rule-Following Tendencies
Behavioral and cognitive theorists have illuminated individuals'
propensities to improperly assess the importance of purchases and contract
terms. Most individuals lack the knowledge structures to understand and
digest the often long and complex form contracts that have become common
in the consumer marketplace." Individuals also may be overly optimistic
about their contracts and fail to foresee potential problems, which may help
explain why so many consumers fall prey to high costs and adjustable rate
mortgages. 89  Similarly, individuals may make economically inefficient or
unwise contract choices due to the sunk-cost effect, cognitive dissonance,
confirmation bias, and low-ball techniques."
As Professor Russell Korobkin has proposed, individuals often suffer
from contracting inertia to the extent they accept preprinted terms, even if
the terms defy industry practice or legal defaults.91 They also may skim
contracts merely to confirm assumptions or salespersons' promises, and
readily accept sales representatives' explanations regardless of their
plausibility. Consumers invest in their purchasing decisions and seek
87. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REV. 291, 307-22 (discussing cognitive biases); Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203,
1204-06, 1222-25, 1243-44 (2003) (discussing law and economics' assumptions regarding
consumer rationality and proposing that "buyers are boundedly rational rather than fully rational
decision makers," and therefore market forces often will lead to inefficient terms in sellers' form
contracts).
88. See Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and Social Psychological
Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call for Mortgage Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16
PSYCHOL, PUB. POL'Y & L. 85, 98-99 (2010).
89. See id at 100-01; see also Shmuel I. Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard
Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 122-24 (2007) (explaining behavioral law and economics
basics); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological
Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583, 1607-09, 1627 (1998) (noting
individuals' "tunnel vision" skewed by their biases). But see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice,
Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1559-75 (1998) (critiquing behavioral
law and economics as merely a psychological and sociological account of human behavior that
"confuse[s] explanation and prediction" and lacks "theoretical ambition").
90. Full discussion of these psychological and behavioral patterns is beyond the scope of this
Article, but I invite you to see Becher, supra note 89, at 124-35 for further explanation of these
various patterns.
91. See Korobkin, supra note 89, at 1586 (advancing the "inertia theory" that parties prefer
default contract provisions).
92. See Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and Information in
Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REv. 211 (1987).
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confirmations that their decisions are sound. This, along with low
expectations regarding their purchases, may help explain study results
indicating that many consumers fail to perceive problems with their
purchases.94 Individuals' rationality is therefore "bounded" to the extent that
they do not properly assess contract provisions or take initiative to protect
their long-term economic interests.95
Many individuals also feel morally obligated to follow through and
comply with the contracts they sign, even when contract terms defy fairness
norms.96  Despite contract law's economic elements, behavioral and
psychological theories, as well as empirical evidence, suggest that
individuals believe there is a moral element to contract performance.
Contracting parties form a "psychological contract" to the extent that they
become sensitive to breaches as influencing their interpersonal trust and
cooperation.98
Although this sense of duty to follow contracts is most prevalent in
intra-communal exchanges, it also can be true in B2C contexts. 99
Consumers may feel obligated to abide by form contract terms regardless of
whether they understood and consciously agreed to the terms ex ante.
Therefore, they may assume they have no recourse on their complaints based
on remedy limitations that they were unaware of at the time of purchase.
Consumers also may feel ashamed that they made purchases or agreed to
services without reading the contracts. Most consumers who first read their
93. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 101-04 (discussing various biases and cognitive
tendencies that contribute to these effects).
94. Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 703-10 (reporting findings on problem perception rates
and articulating possible responses to perceived purchase problems).
95. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471, 1476-81, 1545-47 (1998) (also indicating hope that economists and lawyers would
incorporate empirical findings into their assumptions). But see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and
Economics' Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics' Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 72-74, 125-32 (2002) (critiquing the behavioral law and economics
view as based on only limited empirical research and failing to precisely apply data to account for
variations among decision-makers).
96. See Patrick Devlin, Morals and the Law of Contract, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 43
(1965) (discussing roles of morality in contract law); Andrew Phang, Positivism in the English Law
of Contract, 55 MOD. L. REv. 102 (1992) (also noting moral aspects of contract law).
97. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological
Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633, 638-49 (2010) (discussing the moral impetus to follow through
with contract terms).
98. Id. at 640-42 (emphasizing how people believe that breach is morally problematic and that
resistance to breach is a kind of "moral heuristic"). See also Barbara Mescher, Business Ethics and
the Law of Contract, 8 J.L. & FIN. MGMT. 8, 11 (2009) (highlighting moral impulses to comply with
contract promises). But see Sandra L. Robinson et al., Changing Obligation and the Psychological
Contract: A Longitudinal Study, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137 (1994) (explaining psychological contracts
in employment relationships and how employees' perceived obligations to their employers decrease
over time).
99. See Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 97, at 639-40.
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contracts and learn of remedy limitations when problems transpire "will
lament their bad luck and foolishness for not checking earlier."100
Consumers also are usually inert both pre- and post-contract and are
unlikely to seek contract changes or assert their complaints because they
assume they have no choice but to accept and abide by form terms.'o' This
is especially true when consumers would have to return products or give up
services to pursue their complaints. 102  Furthermore, although some
consumers voice their complaints, most are unlikely to expend the necessary
time and other resources, especially if they are embarrassed by an unwise
purchasing decision.10 3
2. Resource and Patience Limitations
A lack of resources often fuels and coincides with behavioral tendencies
in hindering consumers from seeking remedies regarding their purchase
problems.1 04 Individuals' tendencies to remain inert escalate with the time
and resources necessary for proactive contracting and seeking redress."0 s
Consumers busy with work and family obligations usually ignore fine print
in standard contracts and may pay bills automatically without reviewing
invoices for unexpected charges. For example, most consumers pay for
telephone services without noticing relatively small charges tacked on to
their bills each month by third-party "crammers" who make millions of
dollars from adding charges for fax, Internet, and other services without
customers' express authorization.1o6
100. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674; see also id at 675-76 (explaining the various
arguments).
101. See Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts:
Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 199, 212-17
(2010) (analyzing consumer responses to form contracts both pre- and post-contract, and noting how
consumers assume that standard form terms are binding).
102. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 715 (observing that greater consumer inconvenience
reduces the probability that consumers will voice their complaints about a product or service).
103. See id. at 717-19 (demonstrating that consumers are more likely to complain about objective
defects in a product than subjective dissatisfaction).
104. Id. at 711-13 (discussing study findings regarding consumer complaints).
105. Id. at 714-16 (emphasizing how the difficulty of asserting rights affects complaint rates).
106. See Beat the New 'Cramming' Scams, CONSUMER REP., Aug. 2010, at 13 ('"Crammers
make a lot of money because only half of all consumers ever catch the small charges and
complain."').
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Furthermore, consumers are likely to give up in pursuing complaints
when companies ignore their initial requests for assistance.,0 7 Anger may
lead a consumer to take the time to send an e-mail or letter regarding
unexpected or unfair contract terms or charges. However, most consumers
are likely to capitulate after receiving no response or blanket refusal to
provide redress.108  This is particularly true where the contested charges or
expenses are relatively small.1 09
Indeed, it often is not worth it from a consumer's perspective to expend
time and resources pursuing a relatively small claim. 1 o For example, one
law student reported how he was subjected to a $9.99 fee for "daily
horoscope texts" on his cellular phone bill after applying for what appeared
to be a scholarship." This student never ordered any horoscopes and did
not see the extra charges until he got his bill at the end of the month.1 12
Although this determined law student chose to contest the charge, he
lamented his frustration with spending more than the $9.99 in his time and
resources in the battle.'13 He concluded that most consumers do not detect
or contest the charges, especially with automatic payment of bills through
banks and credit cards.114
Companies also may hinder consumers' pursuit of claims by making it
very unpleasant or stressful for consumers to seek redress. For example, one
consumer reported that after he submitted his information to receive a "free"
credit report from www.freecreditreport.com, he began noticing charges on
107. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 715 (noting that increasing complexity in the
consumer complaint process is related to the likelihood that a consumer will voice their complaint).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 711-17 (reporting findings indicating that the cost of a product or service and the way
problems are dealt with weigh heavily in determining complaint rates).
110. See id
111. E-mail from Richard Emil Masana, Graduate, University of Colorado Law School, to author
(May 31, 2010, 23:10 MST) (on file with author) (documenting his experience with a scholarship
application that required him to provide his basic information, including his cellular phone number,
and which resulted in $9.99 of charges on his phone bill for horoscopes he never ordered).
112. Id.
113. Id.; E-mail from Richard Emil Masana, Graduate, University of Colorado Law School, to
author (June 1, 2010, 10:12 MST) (on file with author).
114. Id The consumer I interviewed also noted how the company sent this scholarship
application to a university e-mail list, and simply asked for name, address, and cellular phone
number. Id Furthermore, the charges suddenly appeared on a regular phone bill with a major
carrier and were ostensibly pursuant to hidden terms in the application. Id. See also E-mail from
Richard Emil Masana, Graduate, University of Colorado Law School, to author (June 1, 2010, 10:24
MST) (on file with author) (answering questions the author asked about the charges, and
highlighting how most students would not notice or contest such charges in a seemingly legitimate
scholarship application); E-mail from Richard Emil Masana, Graduate, University of Colorado Law
School, to author (Nov. 28, 2011, 2:22 MST) (on file with author) (confirming interview remarks).
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his credit card.'" When he called the customer service representative to
complain, the representative insisted that his submission for a free report
required him to sign up for a paid subscription for credit monitoring."' 6 The
representative also made it nearly impossible for the consumer to cancel the
subscription by ensnarling him in a lengthy "tug-of-war.""' Ultimately, the
very persistent consumer cancelled the subscription and further charges, but
he remained liable for the initial subscription charge, which he begrudgingly
paid to avoid any more hassle."'
Similarly, a "[w]eb-savvy personal finance editor" reported how she had
to endure a long battle with her credit card company in seeking to reverse
charges for "free trial" offers for facial products." 9 After she signed up for
the "free trial" and received the initial products, she properly cancelled as
required to escape charges. 20 However, the product sellers billed her for
over $200.121 She spent significant time making multiple calls and sending
letters to the sellers and her credit card company before she eventually
cleared her account.122 Ultimately, she concluded: "Was it worth it? Of
course not. Worse, I think the whole ordeal gave me a new wrinkle." 23
It is true that some consumers may broadcast negative information about
companies' practices through blogs or social networking websites.124
However, consumers already exhausted from unsuccessfully seeking
115. Memorandum from Nathan Vassar, Graduate, University of Texas School of Law, to author
(Apr. 26, 2010) (on file with author) (documenting his experience with
http://www.freecreditreport.com).
116. Id. A very astute law professor relayed a similar story. He and his wife were each being
charged a S15 monthly fee after innocently checking their credit reports through the same site.
E-mail from David Horton, Assoc. Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, to author (Sept. 3,
2010, 16:46 MST) (on file with author). They had no notice of the charge and faced fierce resistance
when they tried to cancel the imposed subscription. Id.
117. See Memorandum from Nathan E. Vasser to author, supra note 115.
118. Id. The consumer concluded: "I ended up hassled and frustrated by the entire experience, as
I had to pay for one month's subscription, and endured a lengthy and difficult phone conversation in
order to release myself from the automatic monthly charge." Id.
119. Julie Sherrier, How I Won My Wrinkle Cream Face-Off TAKING CHARGE: A






124. See id; see also David Segal, A Guide to Complaints That Get Results, N.Y. TIMES (May
22, 2010), http://nytimes.com/2010/05/23/your-money/23haggler.html (regular column, The
Haggler, that chronicles consumers' submitted stories of complaints and how they did or did not get
remedies).
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assistance are unlikely to invest additional time or energy posting their
grievances. Furthermore, consumers may not realize that their contracts
defy legal regulations or standards.125  Companies perpetuate this lack of
information by burying terms in confusing fine print and managing publicity
by quietly appeasing the few sophisticated consumers who complain.
3. Socialization and Biases
Socialization and biases texture the meaning of the objective
"reasonable person" that contract law often assumes with respect to
economic transactions.126 Research indicates that despite legal assumptions,
social stereotypes influence consumers' negotiations and propensities to
assert their rights.127 As an initial matter, American culture generally frowns
on complainers and calls on consumers to maintain a "[s]tiff upper lip."1 28
Stereotypes and socialization also guide when we speak, what we say, and
how others perceive our communications.129 For example, employees may
use speaking opportunities at work to signal certain characteristics such as
strength or intelligence, while employers may screen employees' statements
to assess whether an employee possesses characteristics the employer
values.130
With respect to gender, society teaches women from an early age to be
relational and cooperative, and to display more interest in fostering
relationships than pursuing economic goals. 131 This may lead women to be
constrained by a "psychological straitjacket" that hinders them from
complaining, asking for what they need, or otherwise asserting
themselves.132 Research generally indicates that women often achieve less
125. See Marco B.M. Loos, Individual Private Enforcement of Consumer Rights in Civil Courts
in Europe 5-7 (Ctr. for the Study of Eur. Contract Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2010/01),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1535819 (noting how a lack of information about enforcement
rights and options may squelch consumers' enforcement of their rights).
126. Lu-in Wang, Negotiating the Situation: The Reasonable Person in Context, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 1285, 1285-89, 1310-11 (2010).
127. Id. at 1286-90 (discussing behavioral and psychological research indicating how stereotypes
influence contracting).
128. Plymire, supra note 69, at 61-62 (noting cultural propensities).
129. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 107-10, 113-15, 133-35 (discussing how fear of
stereotypes may impact employees' propensities to make requests at work).
130. Id. at 107-10 (using this scenario).
131. Alice F. Stuhimacher & Amy E. Walters, Gender Difference in Negotiation Outcome: A
Meta-Analysis, 52 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 653, 653-58 (1999) (highlighting research suggesting that
women are more cooperative and relationship-focused in negotiations, but noting that it is unclear
whether this affects negotiation outcomes).
132. See LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, ASK FOR IT (2008) (suggesting strategies to help
women better evaluate their worth and assert themselves in ways that comport with their
personalities); Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation
Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 302 (1999) (discussing gender in negotiations); Laurie
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favorable outcomes in negotiations because they feel less entitled to ask for
what they want.133  One study indicated that men pursue negotiations to
further their own interests about four times more often than women do.134
Survey results also suggest that women are much less likely than men to
recognize opportunities to negotiate.13 5
Women also tend to express self-doubt and use equivocal language in
negotiations, while men display more confidence and initiative in asserting
their rights.'36  Women fearful of appearing "pushy" may refrain from
asserting their rights.137 Of course, this is not true for all women, and some
research indicates no significant difference between men and women with
respect to complaint frequency.33 Nonetheless, the data overall suggests
that women ask for assistance or complain less often than men do. 39
Similarly, research shows that race significantly affects problem
perception and reporting rates within the same socioeconomic groups.140 In
one study, black consumers were much less likely than white consumers to
perceive purchase problems or to complain regarding products and services
of the same quality, thereby indicating that black consumers had lower
expectations.14' Accordingly, the black and white consumers' relatively
equal reported purchase satisfaction rates did not necessarily indicate that
A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs and Benefits of
Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 629, 629-31
(1998) (explaining socialized behavioral differences between men and women, and expectations that
women should be more "community oriented" and less proactive in protecting their own economic
interests).
133. See BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 132, at 1-4 (addressing the "voice" inside many
women's heads telling them they should be happy with what they have and not greedily ask for
more); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the Behavioral
Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 116-20, 125-26 (2008) (discussing
research regarding gender in negotiations).
134. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 132, at 4.
135. Id. at 41 (noting how women were 45% more likely to score low on a rating scale assessing
whether people saw their situations as open to change via negotiations).
136. Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 653-77 (reviewing findings from studies on
gender in negotiations).
137. See also infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that women often
do not "get the grease" in contract negotiations or the workplace).
138. Bird Tronvoll, Complainer Characteristics When Exit is Closed, 18 INT'L J. SERVICE
INDUSTRY MGMT. 25, 33-35 (2007) (noting research regarding gender).
139. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that women ask for
things less frequently than men).
140. Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 707, 723-24 (reporting study findings).
141. See id. at 723-24.
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the consumers received equal treatment.14 2  Instead, the evidence overall
suggested that black consumers generally did not receive the same purchase
benefits because they did not know they deserved or could get these
benefits.143
Stereotypes and biases also may affect how company representatives
and customer service agents react to consumers who complain or ask for
assistance. For example, company representatives may have preconceived
biases based on gender that affect their behaviors.'" Representatives may
view female consumers as "bitchy" if they complain, or weak and easily
brushed aside if they are not assertive.145 In one study, researchers coached
male and female actors to remain "cooperative and pleasantly assertive"
while working with test groups.146 Afterwards, group participants described
the men as having "more ability, skill, and intelligence," but saw the women
behaving in the same manner as "emotional, bossy, and domineering."l47
The participants nonetheless denied having any sex biases when asked
directly about their attitudes.148
Studies similarly suggest that individuals often deny that they are biased
but nonetheless harbor subconscious negative associations with members of
minority groups.149  This may cause company representatives to respond
negatively or offer lesser deals to minority consumers. For example,
Professor Ayres found in his study of Chicago car sales that white women
had to pay 40% higher prices than white men did, and black consumers had
to pay over twice the markup paid by all other customers, regardless of
market competition that should have eliminated such discrimination.so
Surprisingly, this was true although the car dealerships steered the tester-
142. See id at 707, 727.
143. Id. at 727.
144. See infra text accompanying notes 145-59.
145. See Nancy J. Reichman & Joyce S. Sterling, Sticky Floors, Broken Steps, and Concrete
Ceilings in Legal Careers, 14 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 27, 68-69 (2004) ("Women quite rightfully
worry about being labeled 'the Bitch' if they become the squeaky wheel about compensation or if
they 'grand stand' about their accomplishments.").
146. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 132, at 61.
147. Id.
148. Id. See also Wendy Reiboldt, Factors That Influence a Consumer Complainer's Rating of
Service Received from a Third Party Complaint-Handling Agency--The Los Angeles Department of
Consumer Affairs, 16 J. CONSUMER SATISFACTION, DISSATISFACTION AND COMPLAINING
BEHAVIOR 166, 166-67, 171-74 (2003) (reporting survey results regarding complaint handling by an
agency in California and finding that race, income, gender, and other similar factors impacted rating
of service).
149. See Ellen Waldman, Mindfulness, Emotions, and Ethics: The Right Stuff?, 10 NEV. L.J. 513,
526 (2010) (highlighting prejudice at the unconscious level).
150. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104
HARV. L. REV. 817, 819, 822-43 (1991) (noting others' animus-based theories of discrimination and
providing further detail regarding the research methodology and findings).
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buyers to salespersons who shared the buyers' gender and race
characteristics.' 5'
Research in lending contexts also indicates that company representatives
provide the best deals to white male consumers.152 Evidence suggests that
men obtain more attractive mortgages than women do, and lenders steer
minorities and women toward subprime and less desirable loans although
they could qualify for prime mortgages.'13  The National Community
Reinvestment Coalition found in a 2003 field test that lenders treated black
testers, especially black female testers, less favorably than white testers even
though the black testers had better credit profiles.154  Similarly, a 2006
Consumer Federation of American study concluded that lenders were five
times more likely to saddle upper-income black women than upper-income
white men with a subprime mortgage.'5
Contractual discrimination was likely at the core of the dealings at issue
in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.156 In that case, the furniture
seller imposed an onerous cross-collateralization term on consumers in poor
minority neighborhoods, assuming consumers in such neighborhoods
present higher credit risks.' Ms. Williams was an African-American
woman with limited income, and was not a sophisticated consumer to the
extent that she did not detect the onerous cross-collateralization provision in
her purchase contract.' Unlike most consumers in her position, however,
she chose to "speak up" and bring a lawsuit that is now famous for
presenting a "paradigmatic example of an unfair bargain."' 9
151. White men were offered the best deals from white female sellers; white women received the
best prices from black salesmen; black males received the best deals from white saleswomen; and
black females received the best prices from white men. Id. at 840-42. But see Best & Andreasen,
supra note 5, at 727 (finding no statistically significant correlation between socioeconomic status
and satisfactory resolution of consumer complaints, but noting that this is subject to data that those
of lower status are less likely to perceive or raise complaints).
152. Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 653-77.
153. See Carol Necole Brown, Women and Subprime Lending: An Essay Advocating Self-
Regulation of the Mortgage Lending Industry, 43 IND. L. REv. 1217, 1217-22 (2010) (compiling and
citing research regarding discriminatory lending). The research has left many asking "[wihy would
people who could qualify for prime mortgage loans end up with subprime loans?" Id. at 1217.
154. See id at 1219-20 (discussing the study and findings).
155. Id. at 1221.
156. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
157. See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 205-06, 237-40 (discussing discrimination in the
Williams case).
158. See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 897-99 (discussing the case).
159. DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 203-04.
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Companies continually tailor their B2C practices based on "worthiness"
predictions.'60  Companies gather information about consumers through
online registrations and by tracking consumers' buying practices to target
consumers who frequently make high-value purchases, and to avoid or drop
consumers who lack resources for high expenditures.' 6' Companies also
may discriminate against these "low-value, low-sophistication consumers"
who lack resources by ignoring their needs while attending to "high-value,
high-information consumers" that are proactive in seeking contract changes
and benefits.162 A company may provide these "sophisticated" high-value
consumers with waivers, exemptions, and other benefits in hopes of growing
its revenues by gaining their loyalty and hindering them from spreading
negative company reviews.163
Overall, these studies suggest that white men, especially those who
companies consider "high-value," have a significant advantage in the
SWS.'" They are more likely than other consumers, especially women and
black men, to get what they want.165 This leaves the majority of consumers
to bear costs associated with providing benefits to the high-value squeaky
wheels. Although power and context may discount some study results, the
evidence is nonetheless troubling and highlights the need for further research
regarding contract bias.166
4. My Survey Findings Regarding Contract Irrelevance
Along with the above factors, findings from my own survey research
help provide contextual background for exploring the SWS. Survey research
is subject to perception and reporting biases, and individuals' propensities to
160. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
161. See Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U.
ILL. L. REv. 375, 384 (discussing transaction-based versus debt-based credit card issuers, and
explaining how transaction-based issuers seek to maximize the number of cardholders who make
frequent high-value purchases).
162. See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 900-02 (explaining this argument).
163. Id. Nonetheless, some credit card companies may prefer customers they expect to be less
informed or vigilant in their contracting, such as young and low-income consumers with little credit
history or contracting experience. See id These consumers are prone to unknowingly pay extra
charges without complaint. Id. (depicting how issuers make their money from late fees and interest
instead of interchange fees); Karin Braunsberger et al., The Effectiveness of Credit-Card Regulation
for Vulnerable Consumers, 18 J. SERVICES MARKETING 358, 358-70 (reporting credit card
companies' direct mail solicitations to college students and low-income populations in hopes of
attracting new customers with limited credit card experience).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 144-63.
165. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
166. Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 656-74 (noting mixed studies but highlighting
cause for concern as it relates to workplace negotiations).
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report fiscally and socially responsible behavior. 167  Nonetheless, it sheds
light on what consumers care about and how they behave in making
purchases and dealing with purchase problems. Although my survey asked
many questions about consumers' contracting behaviors and perceptions,
this Article focuses on questions pertaining to consumers' actions and
understandings related to seeking contract changes and remedies.
I administered a survey of Colorado consumers that produced a sample
of 306 completed surveys, with roughly one-third male respondents and two-
thirds female respondents.168 About half of these respondents were married,
7.5% lived with domestic partners, and the remaining respondents were
single, separated, or widowed.169  The sample identified as three-quarters
Caucasian or white, and reported varying levels of education; 43% had a
Bachelor's or post-graduate degree, 44% completed some college but had no
degree, and the rest had a high school diploma or less.' Forty-two percent
reported full-time employment, 16% reported part-time jobs, and the rest
reported no employment outside the home.'
As an initial matter, the survey responses revealed general skepticism
regarding remedies for purchase claims. When asked to assess perceived
fairness of dispute or settlement agreements, 32.7% replied "completely" or
"usually" fair, 44.6% were "neutral," and the remainder said "usually" or
167. See Thea F van de Mortel, Faking It: Social Desirability Response Bias in Self-Report
Research, 25 AUSTL. J. ADVANCED NuRSING 40 (2008) (discussing "social desirability bias" which
leads survey respondents to present a favorable image of themselves and answer questions in ways
that conform with social values and norms).
168. See Amy J. Schmitz, Consumer Survey Data and Notes (2007 to present) (unpublished
survey) (on file with author) [hereinafter Survey Notes]. I worked with the Institute for Behavioral
Science (IBS) at the University of Colorado and Survey Sampling International (SSI) in order to
ensure confidentiality and to receive full approval by the Human Research Council at the University
of Colorado. The survey was sent to roughly 10,000 Colorado residents over the age of eighteen in
SSI's research panel in October and November of 2007 in order to ultimately produce a sample of
306 properly completed surveys. Prior to that time, we had dropped from our sample any partial
responses or responses that were otherwise faulty due to skipped questions, "flat-lined" responses,
and other indications that the respondent "cheated" in some way. Through our attempts to gather
more male responses, we learned that women are much more receptive to answering online surveys.
169. See infra app. A, at p. 334.
170. See infra app. A, at pp. 334-36. The sample identified as 74.5% white, 14.7% did not
specify race or ethnicity, and the remainder identified as black, Hispanic, Asian, Indian, Pacific
Islander, or multiple races. See infra app. A, at p. 336.
171. See infra app. A, at p. 334. Many did not identify themselves with respect to occupation. Of
the 82% of those that reported income, roughly 30% stated under $29,999, 30% stated $30,000-
$49,000, 19% stated $50,000-$74,999, 9.6% stated $75,000-$99,999, and 11.2% reported over
$100,000. See infra app. A, at p. 333.
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"completely" unfair.172 Respondents nonetheless replied "usually" or
"completely" fair at much higher rates regarding nearly all of the other types
of contracts listed in the same question. This included warranties (62%), car
sales (57.4%), employment terms (68.5%), and companies' standard form
contracts (57.9%).173 Only gym memberships generated more negative
responses, with 31% reporting "completely" or "usually" unfair.174
The survey also asked consumers to check all the terms, if any, they
"found to be important at some point with respect to a complaint or dispute"
about a purchase.175 This was followed by a list of terms, including those for
price, warranties, fees and other penalties, returning items, cancelling
services, "freebies" or incentives, other and "N/A; I have never had a claim
or dispute."176 Overall, respondents did not report "yes" for many terms to
indicate that they were important in dealing with purchase complaints.' 77
Nonetheless, they indicated importance at the greatest percentages with
respect to terms covering warranties (56.9%), returns (50%), and cancelling
services (46.7%).178
Furthermore, response data confirmed research and theory suggesting
that education influences consumer complaints. There was a significant
positive association between education level and likelihood to notice
anything about arbitration in consumer purchase terms.'79 In addition, there
was a statistically significant positive association between education level
and the likelihood to find warranty terms important regarding consumer
complaints, suggesting that those with more education were more likely to
172. See infra app. B, at p. 343. The survey asked consumers to "think broadly about how fair
(using [their] own sense of 'fairness') [they] view different contracts and purchase terms, regardless
of whether [they] have relevant personal experiences." See infra app. B, at p. 337.
173. See infra app. B, at pp. 337-43.
174. See infra app. B, at p. 337. The percentages reporting "usually" or "completely" fair with
respect to the remaining contracts listed were as follows: loan contracts 52.5%, apartment leases
51.3%, credit card terms 39.1%, Internet purchase terms 44.6%, cell phone contracts 37.2%,
contracts with friends 40%, and contracts with family 41.2%. See infra app. B, at pp. 337-43.
175. See infra app. C, at p. 343.
176. See Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. III, question 6.
177. See infra app. C, at p. 343.
178. See infra app. C, at p. 343. With respect to the other terms, respondents answered "yes" to
importance in percentages as follows: price (19.9%), fees/penalties (37.3%), interest rate/credit
payment (21.6%), freebies/incentives (8.8%), and disclaimers/waivers (17.6%). See infra app. C, at
p. 343.
179. This question asked generally whether respondents had "seen or noticed anything about
'arbitration' in any of their consumer purchase terms. See infra app. M, at p. 363. We used
Kendall's tau to assess association between noticing arbitration terms (dichotomous variable) and
education levels ranging from some college, college degree, some postgraduate, to
master's/Ph.D./etc. (ordinal variable). The association was significant at .154. See Amy J. Schmitz,
Consumer Survey Data Analysis Backup (2007 to present) (unpublished memos and notes with
statistical accounting) (on file with author and Pepperdine Law Review) [hereinafter Analysis
Backup].
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empower themselves in consulting warranty terms to address purchase
problems.180  There also was a significant, but weak, negative association
between education level and the likelihood to mark "never had a dispute." 8 1
This comports with other research indicating that consumers with less
education are less likely to perceive purchase problems or assert their
complaints.182
Survey findings also confirmed consumers' inertia and general failure to
take initiative in negotiating contract terms when making consumer
purchases. Thirty-eight percent of respondents reported "never" and 27.4%
stated "rarely" when asked how often they "try to negotiate or change" form
contracts or terms in making consumer purchases.'83  Only 8.6% said that
they "frequently" or "nearly all the time" seek such purchase term
changes.184 Furthermore, 71.3% of female respondents, as compared with
53.4% of male respondents, reported that they "never" or "rarely" try to
negotiate form terms, which comports with other research suggesting that
women are less assertive in pursuing their contract interests.'85
Out of the 182 respondents who reported trying to change contract
terms, 42.9% said that they "never" or "rarely" succeed in getting merchants
to change their terms.' Furthermore, only 15.9% of the 182, or 29 of the
306 total survey sample, reported that they were successful "frequently" or
"nearly all the time" in changing contract terms. 87 In addition, respondents
indicated very little success in changing particular terms, with the highest for
price at 36.3%.18 The percentages for changing other listed terms were as
180. We again used Kendall's tau to assess association between education level and noting
warranty terms as important with respect to a complaint in Part III, Question 6. The association was
significant at .038, but the level of association was quite low at only .11-with zero being no
association and I or -1 being perfect association. See Analysis Backup, supra note 179.
181. See id.
182. See id. Using Kendall's tau, we found a correlation that was significant at .019. This
provided some evidence that those with less education were more likely to say they never had a
contract dispute. Id.
183. See infra app. D, at p. 346. Analysis is focused on "valid percent" (percent of those who
answered the question) to account for "missing data" (i.e., those who did not answer that question).
See Analysis Backup, supra note 179; Harvard-MTT Data Center's Guide to SPSS,
http://hmdc.harvard.edu/projects/SPSSTutoriallspsstut.shtml (last visited Dec. 24, 2011).
184. See infra app. D, at p. 346.
185. See infra app. E, at p. 346.
186. See infra app. F, at p. 347.
187. See infra app. F, at p. 347. This was a mere 9.4% of the 306 total respondents. See infra
app. F, at p. 347.
188. See infra app. G, at p. 347. The survey question asked: "What types of terms have you been
able to get changed in form contracts? Check all that apply." See infra app. G, at p. 347.
303
follows: warranties (13.4%), fees (19.9%), interest rates for credit payment
(15%), returns (13.1%), cancelling service (10.5%), arbitration (2.3%),
incentives (11.8%), and disclaimers/waivers of liability (5.6%).189
This lack of success in negotiating contract changes impacts contract
expectations. When asked their level of agreement with various statements
regarding form purchase terms, 66.2% of respondents said they "strongly
agree" or "somewhat agree" that they "assume [they] cannot get a seller to
change form terms."o90 Nonetheless, most of the respondents indicated
awareness that it is prudent to read form terms.'9 A total of 71.1% of
respondents indicated that they "somewhat disagree" or "strongly disagree"
that "it is a waste of time to read form terms."' 92 Similarly, 74.4% reported
that they "somewhat disagree" or "strongly disagree" that they "don't see
why" they should read form terms, and 79.3% said they "strongly agree" or
"somewhat agree" that it is "very important to read" purchase terms. 193
At the same time, 30.8% of respondents said that they "strongly agree"
or "somewhat agree" with the statement that they "started reading terms
after [they] had problems with consumer purchases," while 18.8% selected
"strongly agree" or "somewhat agree" with the statement that they "only
read form terms after [they] have a problem" with a purchase.194
Furthermore, there was a significant positive correlation between contract
experience outside of one's consumer role and disagreement with both of
these statements, suggesting that those respondents with more contract
experience were significantly more likely to read terms even if they had not
experienced a purchase problem.195
In addition, only 20.8% of respondents reported that they "frequently"
or "nearly all the time" have "gone back to review terms [they] had
previously read or skimmed because of a complaint or dispute" regarding a
purchase.196 Of the rest, 33.2% said "sometimes" and 8.7% said "half the
189. See infra app. G, at p. 347.
190. See infra app. H, at p. 350; see also Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. II, question 6b.
191. See infra app. H, at p. 350.
192. See infra app. H, at p. 350; see also Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. II, question 6h.
193. See infra app. H, at p. 351.
194. See infra app. H, at p. 352; see also Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. II, question 6g.
195. Again, using Kendall's tau, we found a significant positive association at .105 between level
of disagreement with the Part II, Question 6g statement and level of experience reported in Part IV,
Question 2 (coded 0 to 4 for "very uncomfortable with contracts," "know less than the average
person," "average," "know more than the average person," or "expert or specialist"). Similarly, we
found a Kendall's tau association at .154 between level of disagreement with Part II, Question 6k
and Part IV, Question 2, reported experience. See Survey Notes, supra note 168. This may suggest
that those with more experience are more likely to read contracts regardless of whether or not they
have complaints.
196. See infra app. J, at p. 354. The remainder of respondents stated "never" (5.4%), "rarely"
(23.2%), or "n/a; never had a complaint or dispute" (8.7%). See infra app. J, at p. 354.
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time.""' Furthermore, only 15.8% of respondents said "frequently" or
''nearly all the time," as compared with 40.6% reporting "never" or "rarely,"
when asked how often they read contract terms "for the first time only after
complaints or disputes arose" regarding a purchase.'98
These responses overall suggest that respondents generally do not look
to contract terms in confronting purchase problems, and those who read
contract terms at all generally do so regardless of complaints.199 This is
especially true for respondents who reported greater contracting
200
experience. Instead of focusing on contract terms to address purchase
problems, consumers prefer to seek assistance through personal appeals and
informal communications. 20' They hope that companies will help them in
order to preserve goodwill and prevent negative publicity.202
That said, consumers also may ignore purchase terms because they are
unaware of or do not understand the terms' significance in a given situation.
For example, all but five (1.6%) of the survey respondents said that they
would want more explanation of at least some form contract terms when
asked to "check all the terms that [they] would want the salesperson to
explain" in a car purchase scenario.2 03 Respondents checked that they would
want an explanation in the following percentages: terms requiring that they
"resolve claims through a private means such as 'arbitration' instead of
bringing claims to court" (55.9%),204 incentives (48.7%), general boilerplate
(41.5%), technical/legal words (60.1%), price (72.5%), warranties (92.2%),
fees/penalties (84%), returns (76.1%), and disclaimers (75.2%).205
Respondents also indicated their focus on price and only a few key
contract terms when asked how important they viewed various terms and
factors in making consumer purchases. Respondents stated "very important"
197. See infra app. J, at p. 354.
198. See infra app. I, at p. 353. The remainder of respondents stated "sometimes" (22.1%), "half
of the time" (12.4%), or "n/a; never had a complaint or dispute" (9.1%). See infra app. I, atp. 353.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 175-78.
200. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
203. See infra app. K, at p. 357.
204. This accounted for 57.1% of female and 53.4% of male respondents. See Memorandum
from Heather Park, Research Assistant, to author (Dec. 1, 2011) (on file with author) (documenting
statistical accounting using SPSS); Survey Notes, supra note 168.
205. See infra app. K, at pp. 354-57; see also Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. III, question 3.
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or "somewhat important" at the greatest rate for price (99.3%).206 They next
indicated "very" or "somewhat important" as follows: non-price contract
terms (86.5%), store reputation (84.1%), availability (81.9%), brand or label
(71.4%), financing terms (78.5%), and friendly salesperson[s] (69.3%).207
Furthermore, 64.8% of respondents indicated "very" or "somewhat
important" with respect to family or friend recommendations and 67.1%
indicated the same for "consumer reviews" in publications or on the
Internet.20 8 This was higher than like indications for "personal relationship
to seller" (40.6%), "gut feeling" (53.8%), and "just want it" (56.6%).209
Accordingly, many consumers do consider shared information and may seek
the advice of other informed consumers.
Statistical analysis of survey responses also showed some association
between respondents' demographic information and their indications of
importance with respect to reviews and recommendations in making
purchases. 210  Respondents with higher incomes were more likely to find
consumer reviews important, perhaps suggesting greater access to reviews
and purchase resources. 2 1' There also was a significant correlation between
a respondent's gender and attribution of importance to friend or family
recommendations, with 68.8% of female versus 56.9% of male respondents
212indicating "very" or "somewhat important" for these recommendations.
This may confirm theory and other data suggesting that women are more
relational and family-focused than men in making purchases.2 13 In a sense,
women may listen to "squeaky wheels" more often than men do when
making purchase choices.
Overall, the data suggested that consumers rely mainly on price and
price-related factors in making purchases, and place relatively little
206. See infra app. L, at pp. 359-62. The survey listed specific contract terms and non-contract
factors, and used "non-price" terms as a catchall for the general terms and conditions that were not
otherwise parsed out in the list. See Survey Notes, supra note 168, at pt. I, question 3.
207. See infra app. L, at pp. 358-63.
208. See infra app. L, at pp. 360-62.
209. See infra app. L, at pp. 358, 360-62.
210. See infra app. N, at pp. 364-65.
211. See infra app. N, at pp. 364-65. Using Kendall's tau, we found a significant correlation of
-. 109 between reported income (coded in escalating order starting with 1 for less than $20,000) and
an indication of importance (coded I to 4 for "very important," "somewhat important," "minor
importance," and "not important"). See Analysis Backup, supra note 179.
212. See infra app. 0, at p. 366. Female respondents were therefore significantly more likely to
find these recommendations important per a Kendall's tau of -. 121 between gender (coded I for
male and 2 for female) and an indication of importance (coded I to 4 for "very important,"
"somewhat important," "minor importance," and "not important"). See Analysis Backup, supra note
179
213. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text (noting how women tend to focus more on
relationships than men do in their exchanges).
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emphasis on contract terms that they often do not read or understand.214
Furthermore, consumers may myopically focus on price and fail to consider
the full panoply of information that would assist them in making wise
buying decisions.21 5 They also may carry this myopia forward and fail to
consult their contracts when problems arise. Consumers therefore may
forfeit contract rights that could assist their assertion of post-purchase
complaints.2 16
At the same time, consumers have voiced dissatisfaction with
companies' remedy mechanisms. Consumers in my survey reported
relatively negative perceptions of dispute settlements.2 17 This, in turn, may
increase their skepticism and further hinder their impetus to pursue contract
remedies. Furthermore, this hesitance to assert claims may be even stronger
for those with less economic or social power in the marketplace, especially
when they fear repercussions of stereotypes and biases.21s
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SWS IN THE CONSUMER CONTEXT
These business and consumer behaviors and attitudes converge to fuel
the SWS's interference with contract regulation and allowance for
contractual discrimination to the detriment of the least informed and most
vulnerable consumers.29 Merchants know that most consumers are
uninformed regarding their rights, and may use the SWS to prevent the
informed minority from alerting others about purchase problems and
merchants' practices.220 Merchants therefore may heed demands of the
informed squeaky wheels with the resources to persistently pursue their
rights, while continuing to impose onerous provisions and withhold benefits
214. See infra app. L, at pp. 358-63 & app. H, atpp. 350-52.
215. See infra app. L, at pp. 358-63 & app. H, at pp. 350-52.
216. See infra app. J, at p.354.
217. See infra app. B, at p. 343 (only 32.7% of survey respondents indicated "completely fair" or
"usually fair" with respect to settlements).
218. As with any survey research, it is subject to interpretation differences as well as perception
and other cognitive biases. People read and interpret questions differently, regardless of how "clear"
or sanitized the questions are. Furthermore, people have a natural propensity to believe that their
views are the "normal" views even when they are not. See Lawrence Solan et al., False Consensus
Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1269, 1280-300 (2008) (explaining false
consensus bias and how it applies in contract interpretation contexts).
219. See infra Part III.A-C.
220. See infra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
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for the silent masses. 221 This thwarts market regulation and consumer
protection, and creates an economically unhealthy consumer caste system. 222
A. Silenced "Informed Minority"
Law and economics proponents and other defenders of the market
propose that freedom of contract results in optimal allocation of resources,
assuming that rational consumers will buy the optimal quality and quantity
of goods and services under competitive terms.223 Critics of this proposition
argue that most consumers do not have perfect information, and do not read
224
or understand the complicated terms commonly in form contracts.
Consumers therefore fail to purchase optimal quantities or bargain for
competitive and efficient terms.225 This, in turn, leaves companies free to
take advantage of consumers' lack of information and bargaining power.226
The market therefore fails to police the fairness or efficiency of consumer
contracts.227
Market defenders respond, however, that regardless of whether most
consumers read or bargain for efficient terms, a sufficiently knowledgeable
and noisy "informed minority" will police the fairness of merchants' policies
and practices.228 They propose that companies will cater their contracts to
appease these consumers who read contracts and spread negative
information about company practices, even if it means that the companies
must offer favorable terms to all consumers. 229 Accordingly, the informed
minority of consumers will speak up for the uninformed masses to police
merchants' contract terms.230
Empirical data nonetheless raises serious questions regarding existence
of this "informed minority."231 For example, researchers studied consumers'
Internet browsing behavior with respect to sixty-six online software
companies' websites to explore the veracity of the "informed minority"
221. See infra notes 302-10 and accompanying text.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 312-14.
223. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 3-28 (7th ed. 1992)
(explaining the economic model and the usefulness of economic theory in analyzing law).
224. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 635-54 (explaining the various arguments).
225. See id at 639.
226. Id at 635-47 (setting forth arguments and critiques of economists' assumptions).
227. See id at 671.
228. See id. at 646-62; see also Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 13, at 637-39 (discussing this
theory).
229. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 646.
230. Id. at 636 (explaining the economists' argument "that if a sufficient number of consumers
read and understand latent terms and thereby become informed, then they will demand efficient
terms, and the producers will in turn provide those terms to all consumers").
231. See Bakos et al., supra note 15, at 36-37.
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argument and the factors that lead consumers to access companies' standard
form contracts (referred to as end-user software license agreements, or
"EULAs"). 23 2 The researchers found that only one or two in one thousand
shoppers accessed the studied software EULAs for at least one second.233
Furthermore, they found that shoppers rarely accessed product reviews or
other substitute information sources.234 This left researchers doubtful that an
"informed minority" of Internet shoppers exists, let alone takes the time to
bargain for fair or efficient terms or otherwise drive the content of software
companies' contracts.235
Similarly, research suggests the unlikelihood that a sufficient number of
proactive consumers will regulate merchant practices by spreading
information and taking action ex post regarding purchase problems. 236 One
European study found that only 7% of consumer cases ended with a
resolution in court or an alternative proceeding.237 The researchers also
found that 45% of launched complaints ended with no agreement or
decision, suggesting that consumers who took initial action on their
complaints nonetheless gave up their pursuits along the way.23' Although
some of these complaints may have lacked merit, this indicates that even
initially proactive consumers run out of time and resources to pursue their
claims.
Meanwhile, there is plenty of evidence that most consumers remain inert
and uninformed regarding their contract rights. 23 9 This is not surprising in
light of the high costs of obtaining information and pursing contract
claims.240 In addition, advertising and disclosure laws generally fail to
correct for imperfect information, especially when disclosures add to the
information overload that already clouds consumers' abilities and
232. Id. at 15-17 (studying the browsing habits of 45,091 Internet users).
233. Id. at 3.
234. Id. at 33.
235. Id at 1-5. The researchers nonetheless found that older and higher income consumers are
more likely to access EULAs, and shoppers are more prone to access EULAs with respect to "free"
or otherwise suspect products. Id. at 10-26.
236. See Loos, supra note 125, at 2-14 (discussing the need for reform to increase consumers'
private enforcement of European contract regulations).
237. Id. at 4 (citing a Dutch survey).
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., supra notes 231-35 and accompanying text.
240. See Loos, supra note 125, at 3.
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inclinations to read and understand their contracts.241  In a Consumer
Reports survey, nearly two-thirds of respondents claimed that they read all
of the disclosures regarding a new loan or credit card they obtained in the
prior year, but only 16% of these readers said they found the disclosures
understandable.242 It may take a consumer nearly three hours just to read the
lengthy fine print that usually comes with a car purchase agreement.243
Furthermore, businesses may boost these anti-information impacts by
using especially complicated fine print in their form contracts and teaser
promotions to "shroud," or effectively hide, the true costs of contracts.244
For example, lenders have used negative amortization loan structures and
seemingly benign add-ons for credit insurance that are difficult, if not
impossible, for even the most educated consumers to detect or understand.245
Furthermore, such preprinted form terms have become so widespread that
consumers no longer notice them or assume they must be valid.246 This
perpetuates businesses' abilities to profit from consumers' myopia.
Companies also may manipulate more formal complaint resolution
processes due to consumers' lack of awareness or experience using such
processes.247 This allows merchants to keep claims out of the public eye and
further limit their provision of remedies to relatively few proactive
consumers. 248  Merchants may then continue to impose onerous fees and
one-sided terms on the uninformed majority.249 For example, it surfaced in
congressional hearings that a credit card issuer that inexplicably raised all of
its customers' interest rates by two percent apologized and rescinded the rate
241. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 86-95, 113-26 (discussing the inability of disclosure
laws to protect consumers from predatory lending, and proposing counseling to ease this lack of
protection).
242. Noreen Perrotta, No More Fine-Print Surprises, CONSUMER REP.: MONEY ADVISER, Feb.
2011, at 2 (noting survey results).
243. Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 96 (discussing a case in which the court noted that it took
the consumer two hours and forty-five minutes to read the contract). See also Omri Ben-Shahar &
Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure 1, 7-20, 40-55 (Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin
Law & Econ. Working Paper, 2d Series, No. 516, 2010), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/516-obs-disclosure.pdf.
244. See Alces & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 889-903 (discussing "shrouding").
245. See Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 90-95 (explaining the various predatory practices
that are difficult for consumers to understand or digest).
246. See id. at 98-103 (discussing consumers' lack of knowledge structure to properly assess
terms and their propensity to thus accept terms without question); see also supra Part Il.B.4 (noting
how my survey findings confirm this sentiment).
247. Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 710-17.
248. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 673-75. "Cases abound where parties-informed
consumers-have simply changed standard form contracts to suit their preferences." Id. at 674.
249. See id. at 674-75.
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increase for only the few customers who complained.2 50 "For everyone
else-those who were not sophisticated enough to call-the increase
stuck." 251
The sophisticated consumers then have no reason to inform the masses
about merchants' practices or the availability of purchase assistance; instead,
these consumers may be "complicit in the exploitation of the myopic
because the welfare loss that is born by the myopic redounds to the benefit
of the sophisticated." 252  Companies have more resources for assisting the
sophisticated squeaky wheels when they continue to profit from imposing
onerous terms on the consumer masses.253
Furthermore, even if an informed minority exists, this minority may not
typify or advocate for other consumers.254 Consumers have different buying
and contracting needs, and may not be economically rational in the
traditional sense.255 Moreover, even informed consumers that read contract
terms may agree to onerous or ostensibly unfair terms for various personal
reasons.256
B. Contractual Discrimination
Psychological and social theories suggest that consumers acquiesce to a
low-power status that leads them to accept poor treatment by merchants with
superior economic and bargaining power. 257  This is especially true in
markets dominated by relatively few companies or involving limited supply
250. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22 (2008)
(discussing how companies appease only those who complain, while leaving the masses in the dark
regarding their potential rights).
251. Id.
252. Alces & Hopkins, supra note 18, at 890. See also id. at 885-97 (discussing businesses'
willingness to make exceptions and provide waivers only for the consumers who seek waivers and
exemptions).
253. See id.
254. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 670-72 (highlighting how marginal consumers are not
necessarily the average consumers, and how sellers differentiate among consumers).
255. See generally Morris B. Holbrook & Elizabeth C. Hirschman, The Experiential Aspects of
Consumption: Consumer Fantasies, Feelings, and Fun, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 132 (1982) (discussing
the many factors that affect buyer behavior and calling for more research of those considerations);
William H. Redmond, Consumer Rationality and Consumer Sovereignty, 58 REV. Soc. ECON. 177
(2000) (discussing how consumer choice is a prime example of suboptimal decision-making).
256. See Shmuel I. Becher, Asymmetric Information in Consumer Contracts: The Challenge That
Is Yet to Be Met, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 723, 738-50 (2008) (critiquing the informed minority argument
and explaining how it is false to assume that an informed minority will result in efficient terms).
257. Larry Bates, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative
Analysis of Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1, 29-33 (2002).
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goods or services.25 In addition, sellers may use their power to capitalize on
consumers' over-confidence regarding their purchases and failures to
properly weigh and consider contract risks and information.259 Powerful
lenders, for example, may impose one-sided terms on consumers who rely
on these lenders for much needed credit.260 Stories of this power dynamic
and consumers' lack of protection pervade politics and our current consumer
psyche.261
Nonetheless, informed consumers have the potential to harness their
power by inspiring collective action.262 This relies, however, on consumers
taking action based on what they learn about companies' faulty products and
practices. The SWS hinders this consumer empowerment by suppressing
information sharing and consumers' pursuit of contract claims. This is
especially true for consumers with low socioeconomic status or claims that
involve personal judgment or low-cost items.263
A consumer caste system thus develops, with the average uninformed
consumer falling in the lower class. "[T]he actual complaining customer" is
21
a rarity,26 and consumers who are most vulnerable to feelings of
powerlessness are least likely to complain. 265  Research indicates that
complainers have not only greater "consumer sophistication" in terms of
knowledge and experience regarding their contract rights, but also higher
incomes and educational resources than average consumers.266 These
sophisticated consumers also have higher quality and service expectations,
and less fear of humiliation from complaining.26 7 They generally are more
confident, and thus enjoy more success, in seeking remedies when
258. See Adi Ayal, Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market, 74 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91, 91-100 (2011) (discussing how cell phone companies use complexity to take
advantage of the consumer); Oren Bar-Gill & Rebecca Stone, Mobile Misperceptions, 23 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 49, 118 (2009) (noting how power plays a role in cellular service contracts "designed to
exploit the cognitive biases of many consumers").
259. See Becher, supra note 89, at 136-78 (noting consumers' failure to properly assess low-
probability risks, the likelihood of future incidents, and information buried in impenetrable forms).
260. See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 93-96 (discussing power in the marketplace and the
subtleties of power with respect to bargaining).
261. See, e.g., id
262. See, e.g., id (emphasizing how power can appear in unexpected ways).
263. Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 730.
264. Speer, supra note 52, at 14.
265. See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 95-98.
266. See Tronvoll, supra note 138, at 25-51 (2006) (discussing "consumer sophistication" and
reviewing research literature regarding characteristics of consumers who complain about their
purchases).
267. Id. at 33-35.
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dissatisfied with their purchases.26 8 This is especially true with respect to
expensive purchases.269
In contrast, consumers with lower socioeconomic status often become
accustomed to poor treatment and have lower expectations regarding their
purchases. 270 They therefore are less likely to perceive purchase problems,
let alone to complain to the company.271 One study suggested that a
combination of reported perception and complaint rates showed that "for
every 1,000 purchases, households in the highest status category voice
complaints concerning 98.9 purchases, while households in the lowest status
category voice complaints concerning 60.7 purchases."272 Consumers in the
lowest category likely have less confidence and fewer resources with which
to assert their complaints.273 They also often lack financial education and
may face hurdles created by limited English proficiency.274
Income and education therefore play significant roles in determining
consumers' likelihood to complain and pursue their rights with respect to
their purchases.275 Research also suggests that politically active consumers
and those with high-status jobs are more likely to complain.7 Furthermore,
most studies indicate that younger consumers are more likely to assert their
contract rights.277 To be fair, research is mixed regarding demographic
differences in complaint frequencies, and some studies indicate that the price
of the purchase, the probability of winning the complaint, and the frequency
of the purchase type overshadow demographics in predicting the likelihood
of complaints.278 Nonetheless, the bulk of the evidence suggests that the
268. See id.
269. See id. at 34.
270. Id at 33.
271. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 727 (discussing the role of socioeconomic status in
complaints).
272. Id. at 723.
273. See Tronvoll, supra note 138, at 33.
274. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-518, FACTORS AFFECTING THE FINANCIAL
LITERACY OF INDIVIDUALS WITH LIMITED ENGLISH PROFICIENCY 1, 9 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10518.pdf (reporting the extent to which limited English
proficiency-along with income and education-impact financial education, and the ability to make
informed judgments and take effective actions regarding contracts and money management).
275. See Tronvoll, supra note 138, at 33-34 (gathering research).
276. Id.
277. Id
278. However, at least one study has suggested that consumers over fifty-five are more likely
than consumers under thirty-five to seek contract changes or pursue complaints. See Speer, supra
note 52, at 13. This may explain why a lack of understanding and facility to rectify adjustable rate
mortgage issues has been most pervasive among young, low-income, and uneducated consumers.
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SWS perpetuates a divide between the high-power "haves" and low-power
"have-nots" based on income, education, and age.279
In addition, the SWS further disadvantages minorities and women due to
stereotypes and biases.2 80  As discussed above, customer representatives'
subconscious associations and biases may affect how they negotiate with
consumers, and lead them to offer the worst deals to minorities and
women.2 8' Representatives already prone to resist complaints as attacks on
their self-esteem also may be especially resistant when the complaints come
from individuals against whom they harbor conscious or subconscious
negative associations.
At the same time, some consumers may perpetuate their low-power
283
status by failing to assert their rights based on stereotypical assumptions.
Ex ante, some consumers may fear that seeking contract changes will
backfire or "rock the boat," and cause a seller to revoke an offer.284  For
example, a consumer fearful of being labeled as economically weak or less
worthy based on her gender, race, or residence in an impoverished
neighborhood, is unlikely to question, negotiate, or even read credit card
terms if she fears that the lender will then deny her an extension of credit. 285
Ex post, bias concerns also may influence consumers' impetus to
complain or seek redress. Using female consumers as an example, women
may refrain from complaining about their purchases or contracts due to fear
that they will appear rude or inappropriately masculine.286 Furthermore, the
See Stark & Choplin, supra note 88, at 98-99 (noting research); see also Sharon Oster, The
Determinants of Consumer Complaints, 62 REv. EcON. & STAT. 603, 605-06 (1980) (discussing a
study linking complaint frequency with purchase type); Tronvoll, supra note 138, at 33-35 (noting
research regarding gender).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 264-78.
280. See DIMATTEO ET AL., supra note 15, at 237-40 (discussing contractual discrimination
based not only on economics, but also on perceptions and attitudes based on factors such as race).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 144-55 (discussing data regarding contractual
discrimination based on race and gender).
282. Plymire, supra note 69, at 61-62 (explaining the emotional components of complaint
discussions).
283. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 108-10 (discussing how an employee's statements at
work may confirm or disconfirm stereotypes and the propensity for minority employees to refrain
from complaining due to stereotype concerns); see also supra text accompanying notes 144-55
(discussing the role of stereotypes in the SWS).
284. See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM.
Soc. REv. 55, 60-64 (1963) (explaining how "detailed negotiated contracts can get in the way of
creating good exchange relationships between business units"); Loos, supra note 125, at 5-7
(explaining how negotiators may avoid potentially deal-breaking departures from status quo contract
terms).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 156-66 (discussing Williams and contractual
discrimination based on such status).
286. See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 109-10 (providing the example of a female Latino
employee in a white, male-dominated workplace who may be more cautious in criticizing
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more concerned a consumer is about affirming negative labels, the greater
the likelihood that she will feel constrained in her communications.287 This
gives companies greater leeway in perpetuating the SWS to raise costs and
risks for outsiders in seeking contract changes or other assistance.288
That said, consumers also bear fault for not voicing their contract needs
and complaints.289 Some consumers' inertia may prevent them from taking
initiative to assert their needs, while other consumers may be "biased"
against companies to the extent that they assume that companies are
heartless or will necessarily refuse to consider their complaints.290
Consumers in the focus groups I held in Denver seemed to coalesce around
this assumption after one consumer opined that with contract or purchase
disputes, consumers feel: "Hey, I ain't gonna win no matter what. It's just a
matter of luck if I can get through this transaction and not get screwed." 291
She voiced a presumption that there is no reason to ask companies for
assistance since most consumers are "at middle and below."292
To some extent, it is fair for companies to reward those who take
initiative to seek assistance and other benefits.293 However, stereotypes and
biases can make it disproportionately difficult for some consumers to get
desired results.294 Companies may use hasty assumption in deciding which
squeaky wheels are worthy of assistance. 295 As discussed, companies may
differentiate among consumers based on income, job status, race, and
gender, and offer different deals based on their biases, perceptions, and
assumptions.296 They generally favor consumers they deem high-value,
institutional policies due to a stereotype of female Latinos being hostile or less loyal than white male
counterparts).
287. See id. at 114-22, 133-39 (also explaining how "[o]utsiders who perceive there to be
negative stereotypes of them are likely to lose out" in a SWS at work).
288. Id at 133-42 (further explaining how employers may exploit outsider vulnerabilities in a
SWS).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 87-103.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 87-103.
291. See Focus Group Transcript, supra note 61.
292. Id.
293. See Cruz & Hinck, supra note 8, at 674-75 (discussing how companies engaged in this
behavior benefit from cost savings).
294. See supra Part II.B.3.
295. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 2, at 135 (discussing how sometimes, in the
employer-employee context, employees may be too quick to label someone as a complainer whose
comments do not deserve attention).
296. See supra Part II.B.3.
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while ignoring the majority of consumers without resources to recognize or
assert their complaints or needs.297
Furthermore, stereotypes may cloud public perception of some
consumers' complaints. For example, the public may quickly brush aside a
female consumer's blog post stated in emotive language.298 Contractual
discrimination under the SWS thus deepens a divide between squeaky
wheels with the power and resources to pursue their needs, and the majority
of consumers, who subsidize rationed remedies provided to the high-value
minority by quietly paying fees and enduring onerous terms. 299
C. Under-Enforcement of Consumer Protections and Stifled Public Voice
As noted above, an extremely small percentage of consumer complaints
reach third parties, thereby allowing businesses to control complaint
resolution and hinder both consumer remedies and education with respect to
faulty goods and services.300 Public litigation and class actions serve
important functions in enforcing public protections and giving voice to
"little guys" who could never achieve redress through individual actions.30'
However, the SWS impedes these functions by quieting consumers with the
resources to either lead class actions or otherwise initiate public mechanisms
for enforcing consumer protections and other legal regulations.
Some companies target squeaky wheels who threaten class actions with
settlement offers in order to shut down such public proceedings.302 For
example, in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,303 Gateway offered to waive a
contractual thirty-day return limit and give the Hills a full refund in hopes of
shutting down their attempt to lead a class action regarding Gateway
computer problems."t The case history evidences how the SWS allows
297. See supra text accompanying notes 160-63.
298. See supra text accompanying note 145. Nonetheless, the public should ignore Internet
complaint postings that are abusive or unfounded.
299. See Horton, supra note 59, at 605-09 (2010) (noting how contract adherents have no reason
to expend time and resources shopping for terms that companies may unilaterally change, while
companies feel no pressure to change form procedural terms to suit adherents' preferences).
300. Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 728-29.
301. See, e.g., Jeffrey I. Shinder, In Praise of Class Actions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 2010, at 39
(discussing the importance of class actions to give voice to "little guy" consumers who have been
wronged by credit card merchants).
302. See Eugene J. Kelley, Jr. et al., Offers of Judgment in Class Action Cases: Do Defendants
Have a Secret Weapon?, 54 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 283, 284 (2000) (discussing when settlement
offers are made before filing of class certification motions to moot a named plaintiffs claim); David
Hill Koysza, Preventing Defendants from Mooting Class Actions by Picking Off Named Plaintiffs,
53 DUKE L.J. 781, 789 (2003) (addressing defendants' use of settlement offers to preclude plaintiffs
from leading class actions).
303. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
304. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 679,
707-09 (discussing the case and its exemplification of this dynamic).
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companies to quiet public lawsuits, thereby hindering development of the
law and leaving most consumers uninformed and perhaps without redress
regarding product defects.305
Similarly, in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, the
court used Green Tree's post-hoc offer to pay the consumers' costs of
arbitration in justifying its enforcement of an arbitration clause in Green
Tree's form consumer contracts.306 In that case, the consumer sought to
invalidate the arbitration clause in order to lead a class action alleging that
Green Tree violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and other laws. 307 The
United States Supreme Court rejected the consumers' arbitration clause
challenge, however, finding that the consumer did not prove that she would
not be able to vindicate her rights due to high arbitration costs.0 s The Court
seemed to rely on Green Tree's offer during oral arguments to cover any
unaffordable costs.3 09 This allowed the company to use the SWS, coupled
with arbitration, to prevent a class action and public exposure that may have
forced the company to change its contracts for the benefit of all
consumers. 310
The SWS is therefore similar to arbitration and other private settlement
processes in that it allows companies to privatize or internalize complaint
resolution. 3 1  It also hinders development of the law and limits public access
to information regarding faulty products and company improprieties.312 The
SWS also leaves parties without direction regarding future behavior. 3
305. Id. at 707 (also noting how the Hills may have been "less vocal victims of corporate avarice"
or possibly "mendacious malcontents").
306. See 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000); id. at 92-97 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
307. The consumer claimed that she could not vindicate her statutory rights under the form clause
that called for the parties to split arbitration costs, which could equal or exceed any damages she
stood to collect on her small claim. Id. at 90-91 & n.6 (majority opinion).
308. Id. at 91-92.
309. See id. at 93-95 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating how counsel
for Green Tree merely "offered a hint" during oral arguments in the direction that it would pay the
consumer's arbitration costs, but there was "no reliable indication in [the] record that [the
consumer's] claim will be arbitrated under any consumer-protective fee arrangement").
310. See id.; see also Coneff v. AT & T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1257-60 (W.D. Wash.
2009) (highlighting the functions of class actions).
311. See generally supra text accompanying notes 302-10.
312. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal Process or
Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1093-97 (1999) (claiming that judicial adjudication, in contrast
to arbitration, can stimulate legal development and create public values largely because courts
communicate with each other and the public through recorded opinions).
313. See id. at 1095-97 (noting how arbitration does not create precedent or speak to the public).
317
That is not to say that private settlements and arbitration agreements are
necessarily bad.3 14  They can be beneficial when fairly and properly
monitored and administered, especially in basic contract disputes or intra-
communal contexts in which parties share power and understandings. 315
Privatization of claims resolution can nonetheless be troubling with respect
to discrimination, consumer protection, and other claims affecting public
health or safety.1 Public proceedings and judicial opinions shed light on
these issues and may spark further investigations and policy initiatives.3 1
Courts are "equipped to expose manufacturers who manipulate and hide
behind the law." 3 18
For example, public action often is necessary to uncover product recall
and complaint information. Consumers generally must take initiative to
register purchased products to receive notification of recalls, and must file
Freedom of Information Requests to obtain information regarding product
complaints.3  Consumer Reports found in its 2010 survey of 2,005 adults
that only a fifth of the respondents were aware of recalls regarding products
they had purchased in the past three years. 320  Furthermore, less than a
quarter of respondents said they researched product recalls, and nearly a
third of those who learned of recalls took no action on the recalls. 32 1 "[A]n
additional 15 percent simply threw the product in the trash rather than
returning it for a refund, an exchange, or a free repair." 32 2  Nonetheless,
policymakers hope that a new Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC) database, launched in March 2011, will address this lack of
314. See Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267, 299
(1995) (discussing the benefits of arbitration to consumers, including speed and cost).
315. See id
316. See id. at 318 (arguing that arbitration denies consumers statutory protections due to limited
discovery, lack of class action procedures, and absence of written opinions). But see Meredith W.
Nissen, Class Action Arbitrations, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Summer 2005, at 19, 21 (explaining AAA
class arbitration rules requiring that reasoned awards be made publicly available).
317. See Christopher Placitella & Justin Klein, The Civil Justice System Bridges the Great Divide
in Consumer Protection, 43 DuQ. L. REv. 219, 223-35 (2005) (emphasizing the uneven power
structure in pharmaceutical cases and the need for civil litigation to protect consumer interests).
318. Id. at 231. For example, the courts played an important role in exposing the inadequacy of
fabric flammability standards. Id. at 231-34 (discussing how consumers had to prosecute court
claims regarding flammable children's clothing in the 1980s to make the public aware of
flammability regulations' inadequacies and companies' manipulations of these regulations).
319. Iffy Product? Now a Way to Tell, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 2011, at 16, 16-17 [hereinafter Iffy
Product] (highlighting the difficulties of obtaining information regarding complaints and companies'
power in blocking information); Trouble with Recalls, supra note 9, at 15 (advising consumers to
register products to receive recall information).
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enforcement by providing consumers and manufacturers with a central portal
for reporting and learning about product problems.323
IV. NEW AVENUES FOR INFORMATION AND REMEDIES
The confluence of these economic, behavioral, and social factors has
allowed the SWS to limit consumer information and remedies regarding
purchase problems.324 The SWS has elevated merchants' private dispute
resolution practices above the law in determining consumer complaints.32 5
However, the Internet and computer-mediated communication (CMC)
provide hope for consumers to break free from the barriers of the SWS, and
326
may fuel policy initiatives for expanded consumer remedy mechanisms.
These mechanisms should be designed to increase consumer education
regarding contract rights, and ease the costs and burdens of accessing
remedies. 327 They also should seek to address B2C power imbalances, and
level the playing field for all consumers-regardless of wealth, education,
race, or age. 2t Specifically, policymakers should capitalize on the benefits
of CMC to create and regulate Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) processes
that are free or low-cost for consumers.329
A. Utility of Online Communications in the Digital Age
The expansion of CMC and online mechanisms has had important
influences in the SWS. Digital dogma boasts the promise of the Internet,
323. Iffy Product, supra note 319, at 16-17 (discussing the new database and other technology
upgrades contemplated by the CPSC).
324. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 727-34.
325. Id. at 730.
326. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Creating a Market for Justice; a Market Incentive Solution
to Regulating the Playing Field: Judicial Deference, Judicial Review, Due Process, and Fair Play in
Online Consumer Arbitration, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 3 (2002) (discussing consumer use of the
Internet to access information and utilize dispute resolution).
327. See Amy J. Schmitz, "Drive-Thru "Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering Consumers
Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178,240-43 (2010).
328. Best & Andreasen, supra note 5, at 730-31.
329. See Schmitz, supra note 327 (discussing how online arbitration, what I term "OArb," opens
new avenues for consumers to obtain remedies on their contract complaints); see also Philippe
Gillidron, From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen: Real Hope or True Fallacy?, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 301, 308-10 (2008) (noting use for consumer small claims); Haitham A. Haloush &
Bashar H. Malkawi, Internet Characteristics and Online Alternative Dispute Resolution, 13 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 327, 327-29 (2008) (discussing how use of online ADR can foster efficient dispute
resolution and maximize the growth of e-commerce in England and abroad).
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wireless telephones, and continually emerging technologies.330 However,
the growth of CMC also raises concerns regarding relational isolation,
diminished creativity, and increased deception.3 ' CMC has inspired a new
generation that communicates through text messages instead of telephone
calls, and socializes through chat rooms, blogs, and networks like Facebook
and Twitter.332 Handwritten letters and personal phone calls have become
rarities.333 Nonetheless, the benefits of CMC outweigh its drawbacks for
consumers seeking to make wise purchases and access remedies when
problems arise.
1. Reservations Regarding Use of CMC
CMC and e-contracting have created benefits and burdens for
consumers. 334 Companies have nearly eliminated face-to-face (F2F)
customer assistance. They often make it very difficult for consumers to
locate merchant telephone contact numbers, let alone reach a live
representative capable of handling one's concerns.335 E-contracting also has
allowed companies to shroud form terms in computer links and confusing
website configurations, and to continually modify provisions ex post.336
Many merchants routinely reserve the right to make post-contract changes to
their standard e-contracts, and to post changes on their websites without
sending alerts to those affected.33 1 Consumers visiting brick-and-mortar
330. Schmitz, supra note 327, at 180.
331. Nicole Gabrielle Kravec, Dogmas of Online Dispute Resolution, 38 U. TOL. L. REv. 125
(2009) (discussing "dogmas" of communication via the Internet in resolving disputes). Like Kravec,
I am using "dogma" in this context to refer to a "generally held set of formulated beliefs that a group
holds to be true." Id. at 126.
332. See Betsy Israel, The Overconnecteds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/05/education/edlife/connect.html?scp=1&sq=The+Overconnected
s&st-nyt.
333. See id Please excuse the nostalgia, but this loss is significant from social and psychological
perspectives.
334. See Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the
Institutionalization of Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1147,
1169-81 (2010) (discussing the pros and cons of technology with respect to consumer contracting).
335. See Sheri Carder & Larry Gunter, Can You Hear Me? Corporate America's Communication
with Dissatisfied Customers, J. AM. & COMP. CULTURES, Fall 2001, at 109, 110 (finding, in a study
of consumer complaints, that many consumers are unable to receive adequate assistance through
telephone calls).
336. See Budnitz, supra note 334, at 1169-71 (highlighting e-contracting and dangers of using
online contracts subject to modification).
337. See id. (noting that while courts enforce such post-contract changes, there is debate as to the
proper method of notice of the changes).
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stores also find it very difficult, or impossible, to find staff at those stores
with the authority to make contract changes or provide redress.338
Companies also may use CMC in their rationing-by-hassle tactics to
avoid consumers' claims.339  Some companies ignore e-mails or send
automated replies that lead consumers to give up pursuit of their
complaints.340 While CMC usually is convenient, it also lacks the intimacy
and social cues that enhance F2F interactions.341  This was why many of the
consumers in my Denver focus groups voiced complaints with companies'
online communications, and concluded that they often prefer to discuss
complaints and claims in person with a manager or other company
representative.342 They also were unaware of companies with more formal
online complaint mechanisms.343
The anonymity of CMC also allows for "cyber bullying." 344 "It's easier
to fight online, because you feel more brave and in control." 345  CMC
negotiators may become overly aggressive by adopting negative emotional
styles due to the social and physical distance created through Internet
communications.4 CMC may diminish empathy, which may hinder dispute
338. However, consumers also reported great difficulties in attempting to contact company
representatives by telephone or e-mail to negotiate terms or resolve complaints. This was especially
true when purchasing goods or services via the Internet. See Focus Group Transcript, supra note 61.
339. See Lewis, supra note 4, at 100 (noting the use of hassle tactics to avoid claims).
340. Carder & Gunter, supra note 335, at 110.
341. See Kravec, supra note 331, at 125-30 (discussing and questioning social connections and
contextual cues in online mediation).
342. See Focus Group Transcript, supra note 61.
343. Id.
344. Ann Epstein & Jeffrey Kazmierczak, Cyber Bullying: What Teachers, Social Workers, and
Administrators Should Know, 3 ILL. CHILD WELFARE 41, 42 (2006-2007), available at
http://www.illinoischildwelfare.org/archives/volume3/icw3-3.pdf
345. Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2010),
http://www.nytimescom/2010/06/28/style/28bully.html?emc+etal&pagewanted=print (discussing
"cyberbullying," defined by the Cyberbullying Research Center as "'willful and repeated harm'
inflicted through phones and computers"). See also Epstein & Kazmierczak, supra note 344, at 41-
45 (citing cyber bullying incidents); Nancy S. Kim, Website Proprietorship and Online Harassment,
2009 UTAH L. REv. 993, 1006-15 (discussing cyber harassment and cyber bullying); Parents: Cyber
Bullying Led to Teen's Suicide, ABCNEWS.COM (Nov. 19, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/
story?id=3882520&page=1 (reporting a teenage suicide prompted by malicious Internet postings).
346. See JARON LANIER, You ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 60-63 (2010) (noting the anti-
human approach fostered by the expansion of Internet life); Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D.
Harbaugh, Taking the Lawyer's Craft into Virtual Space: Computer-Mediated Interviewing,
Counseling, and Negotiating, 10 CLINICAL L. REv. 115, 137-38 (2003) (discussing the allowance
for negative or rude communications through CMC, and its relation to "flaming" biases).
321
resolution.347 Internet communications also are more vulnerable to
misinterpretations than F2F discussions to the extent that speakers cannot
immediately clarify their comments.3 48  Nonetheless, regular use and
common acceptance has helped standardize many textual cues, and this trend
is likely to continue with increasing use of CMC.34 9
2. Overriding Benefits of CMC for Accessing Remedies
Despite these concerns regarding the growth of CMC, most agree that
CMC's benefits outweigh its drawbacks. Online contracting fosters
efficiencies that generate time and money savings for companies and
consumers.350  Companies enjoy cost savings from standardization and
inexpensive administration of online contracts and communications, and
may pass these savings on to consumers through lower prices and higher
quality goods and services.3 1 Consumers also enjoy the conveniences of
managing accounts, paying bills, and communicating with companies online
with relatively little cost or time.352 Many companies also are more
responsive to requests and questions sent through e-mails or their own
website's chat or other message systems. 3 53
Moreover, CMC has lowered hurdles and broadened means for
consumers to seek remedies on their purchase complaints. The relative
anonymity, privacy, and comfort of communicating from behind one's
computer or smartphone often alleviate some of the social and power
pressures of F2F communications that otherwise hinder many from asserting
their complaints.354 Visual contact alone creates stress and tensions for
347. Matt Richtell, Attached to Technology and Paying a Price, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/technology/07brain.html?src+me&ref-technology.
348. See LANIER, supra note 346, at 60-63 (discussing dehumanizing impacts of the Internet).
349. See Bastress & Harbaugh, supra note 346, at 118-26 (detailing the trends of increased use of
CMC in lawyering).
350. See Shmuel I. Becher & Tal Z. Zarsky, E-Contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form
Contracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 303,
309-10 (2008) (noting ways that online standard form contracts save money for vendors and
increase consumer confidence).
351. Seeidat310.
352. See Judy Strauss & Donna J. Hill, Consumer Complaints by E-mail: An Exploratory
Investigation of Corporate Responses and Customer Reactions, 15 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 63,
64 (2001) (noting how customers increasingly send companies e-mails for a number of reasons).
353. See id. at 65 (indicating that responses to e-mails are quicker than responses to postal mail
correspondence).
354. See Paul Stylianou, Online Dispute Resolution: The Case for a Treaty Between the United
States and the European Union in Resolving Cross-Border E-Commerce Disputes, 36 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 117, 125 (2008) (recognizing that F2F communications can result in "negative
emotion").
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some, especially if they fear stereotypes or biases based on appearance.3
Despite reports of cyber bullying, many are actually less defensive or
adversarial online than in-person.356 In addition, CMC has become less
sterile over time, as individuals have developed means for virtually building
rapport with others and expressing their emotions over the Internet."
The Internet also has opened avenues for consumers to share
information about their purchase experiences.358 This has given rise to
online watchdog websites such as the Utility Consumers Action Network
(UCAN). UCAN provides an online forum for consumers to alert others
regarding contract dangers and to offer suggestions for avoiding or
responding to consumer issues. 359 Furthermore, the Internet opens doors for
consumers to research their purchases.360 Some individuals also are more
cautious in composing e-mails because they know that it has become very
difficult to completely erase or retract them.361
355. Id. at 125-26 (noting how online dispute resolution allows parties to focus on the substantive
issues, although this lack of F2F contact also has its drawbacks for facilitative processes).
356. See David Allen Larson & Paula Gajewski Mickelson, Technology Mediated Dispute
Resolution Can Improve the Registry ofInterpreters for the DeafEthical Practices System: The Deaf
Community Is Well Prepared and Can Lead by Example, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 131, 141
(2008) (explaining evidence that less bullying occurs through online communication than F2F).
357. Id. at 140-41 (noting how "[t]echnology can protect parties from uncomfortable or
threatening face to face confrontations and offer vulnerable individuals a place where their
communications can appear as forceful as the statements of someone who is physically much larger
and louder," although it also creates risks for cyber bullying).
358. See Budnitz, supra note 314, at 1180-81 (noting how technology can enhance consumer
protection by providing portals for consumers to share information regarding companies and
products).
359. See UCAN, http://www.ucan.org (last visited Jan. 1, 2012) (describing itself as a "non-
profit, public interest consumer advocacy" group focusing on energy, communications, and water,
and providing a complaint forum along with additional resources); see also Mike Scott, Cell Phone
Companies Changing Contract Terms, THE FINE PRINT: UCAN'S CONSUMER WATCHDOG BLOG
(Nov. 12, 2007), http://www.ucan.org/blog/telecommunications/wireless/contractchange/
cellphonecompanies changing contract terms (alerting others of changes in contracts that many
would not catch); Vince, Cancel Your Sprint/Nextel Contract Without an Early Termination Fee,
Telecommunications, UCAN (Jan. 2, 2008), http://www.ucan.org/telecommunications/wireless/
cancelyour sprint nextel contract without earlytermination fee (providing advice on how to
avoid cancellation charges).
360. See Gibbons, supra note 326, at 3 (discussing how the Internet is used by consumers to
research prices). Although some individuals are not sufficiently careful in communicating online,
there is some evidence that a growing number of online users are becoming more cautious in light of
privacy and other concerns. Susan C. Herring, Computer-Mediated Communication on the Internet,
36 ANN. REv. INFO. SCI. & TECH. 109, 144-45 (Blaise Cronin ed., 2002) (noting how Internet users
are becoming more careful in their online communications due to concerns about privacy threats).
361. See Herring, supra note 360, at 145.
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CMC also has given rise to more formalized ODR. ODR generally has
included online mediation, arbitration, and other dispute resolution processes
that minimize or dispel the need for F2F communications by utilizing
website message systems, e-mails, and other CMC platforms. 3 62 These ODR
processes can be relatively inexpensive, and allow for flexible scheduling,
asynchronous communication, and real-time dialogue.6 They also may be
faster and less intrusive than in-person dispute resolution processes.364
Furthermore, many predict that ODR will grow in coming years due to its
ability to transcend borders and escape the constraints of other legal
processes less suited for resolution of e-commerce and international
disputes.365
Nonetheless, the limited ODR processes currently offered for consumer
claims are usually non-binding, only applicable if the consumer agrees to
use the merchant's own ODR process, and rarely used due to companies'
failures to notify consumers about their ODR rights. For example, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
administers a non-final ODR process under the Uniform Dispute Resolution
Procedures (UDRP) that parties may use in resolving domain name disputes
if they agree in advance to use the process.
The social networking website Facebook also has implemented an ODR
mechanism through TRUSTe for resolution of consumers' privacy
362. Am. Bar Ass'n's Task Force on Elec. Commerce & Alt. Dispute Resolution, Addressing
Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations and Report, 58 Bus. LAW. 415, 419
(2002) [hereinafter ABA 2002 Report] (broadly defining ODR).
363. See Gillidron, supra note 329, at 328-34 (explaining how use of ODR provides beneficial
and efficient avenues for communication that may transcend benefits of the F2F environment in
traditional ADR).
364. This prompted the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) 2000 public workshop and 2001
roundtable discussions exploring expanded use of ODR for resolution of consumer disputes
regarding online transactions. Public Workshop: Alternative Dispute Resolution for Consumer
Transactions in the Borderless Online Marketplace, 65 Fed. Reg. 7831 (Feb. 16, 2000); Public
Roundtable on Dispute Resolution for Online Business-to-Consumer Contracts, 66 Fed. Reg. 7491
(Jan. 23, 2001). It appears from the FTC website and other research that little has happened since
these events.
365. See, e.g., Int'l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, More More More: CPR Meeting
Highlights, 27 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 125, 127-28 (2009) (highlighting technology
and ODR as key elements in the future of dispute resolution).
366. Jason M. Osborn, Note, Effective and Complementary Solutions to Domain Name Disputes:
ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and the Federal Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act of 1999, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 209, 214 (2000). The UDRP was
adopted on August 26, 1999, and the implementation documents were approved on October 24,
1999. Timeline for the Formulation and Implementation of the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-
Resolution Policy, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-schedule.htm (last modified Aug. 13,
2010); Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN): Rules for Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 39 I.L.M. 952 (2000); WIPO Arbitration Rules, WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/arbitration/rules/index.html (last visited
Jan. 5, 2012).
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disputes. 6 Under the applicable rules, Facebook must comply with
TRUSTe determinations regarding misuse of personally identifiable
information or violations of privacy. The problem is that consumers are
generally unaware of their rights to use the TRUSTe process.368 This is
because such rights are buried in the labyrinth of terms and conditions
posted among the links on Facebook.369  Furthermore, consumers are
generally unaware that the BBB also tracks complaints against Facebook.370
B. Suggestions for Expanding and Equalizing Consumer Assistance
The time is ripe for commentators and policymakers to consider how the
SWS fosters contractual discrimination and corrosion of "informed
minority" market regulation, and to design complaint mechanisms that help
expand and equalize consumers' access to remedies. 7  Policymakers should
capitalize on the benefits of CMC to craft complaint mechanisms and ODR
processes that are transparent, user-friendly, and worth their costs in light of
the complexity and possible payout on the claims at issue.372 In addition,
processes should be sufficiently simple for consumers to use without the
need for legal assistance, and should allow consumers to obtain neutral
claim evaluations and enforceable remedies.3 3
367. See John Gamble, Facebook & TRUSTe, TRUSTE BLOG (May 12, 2010),
http://www.truste.com/blog/2010/05/12/facebook-truste/ (noting Facebook and TRUSTe's business
relationship since 2006); see also File a Privacy Complaint, TRUSTE, http://watchdog.truste.com/
pvr.php?page=complaint (last visited Jan. 5, 2012); Privacy Program Requirements, TRUSTE,
http://www.truste.com/privacy-program-requirements/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2012); Watchdog Dispute
Resolution Process, TRUSTE, http://www.truste.com/why TRUSTe privacy services/online-
privacy-watchdog (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
368. See Watchdog Dispute Resolution Process, supra note 367 (further explaining the TRUSTe
process). Notably however, the process strictly limits eligible claims and allowable remedies, and
gives TRUSTe great discretion in applying these limits. Id.
369. See Memorandum from Heather Park, Research Assistant, to author (May 25, 2010) (on file
with author) (documenting and reporting an informal poll of users indicating that they did not know
about the eTrust online process for resolving privacy disputes against Facebook). Admittedly, this
was not a scientific or thorough survey, but it nonetheless shed light on common Facebook users'
awareness regarding this ODR process. See also E-mail from David Horton to author, supra note
116 (recounting one law professor's struggle to get out of a contract after overlooking click-wrap on
a "free" service); Memorandum from Nathan Vassar to author, supra note 115 (reciting one law
student's battle with a company after failing to read e-contract terms).
370. See BBB Business Review-Facebook, BETTER Bus. BUREAU, http://sanjose.bbb.org/
Business-Report/Facebook-223670 (last visited Jan. 16, 2012).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 160-63.
372. Geoffrey Davies, Can Dispute Resolution Be Made Generally Available?, 12 OTAGO L.
REv. 305, 308-16 (2010).
373. See id. at 309-18 (noting what works and does not work in dispute resolution mechanisms).
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With this in mind, the first step should be to raise awareness regarding
available remedies. Individuals gain confidence to pursue their rights and
are more proactive in economic choices when they learn what others ask for
and obtain with respect to similar complaints.374 Industry and consumer
groups such as the BBB already compile and post general statistics regarding
complaints that consumers file with the BBB, but should also post
information regarding companies' provision of price and fee reductions to
consumers upon request. For example, the BBB could require companies
seeking its approval to submit reports stating average fee and price
reductions they provide to consumers who ask. Membership fees could
cover the relatively low cost of compiling and adding this information to
BBB postings. The database could resemble the aforementioned CPSC
database for product safety complaints that launched in 2011.171
Independent and industry groups should also work together to educate
consumers about existing complaint resolution mechanisms. For example,
the BBB facilitates mechanisms for resolving consumers' complaints against
automobile dealers, cellular phone companies, and most other B2C
merchants.376 These mechanisms help consumers gain companies' attention
on their claims, and often lead to dispute settlements. These processes are
non-binding unless the parties agree that the result will be final, but
companies' reputational concerns often prompt them to provide remedies on
claims that the BBB determines valid and supported by adequate
information to be worthy of response. Furthermore, these processes help
consumers structure their complaints and communications with
companies. This can be especially useful for consumers who otherwise
lack the education or experience to assert complaints on their own.378
374. See Wang, supra note 126, at 1309-11 (proposing that employees gain access to information
regarding others' salaries to address gender differences in negotiations and to help women obtain
equal pay); Penelope Wang, 7 Secrets to a Richer Retirement, CNN MONEY (Sept. 22, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/09/21/retirement/richer-retirement.moneymag/index.htm (noting how
individuals may increase their saving for retirement when aware of what others are saving).
375. See supra note 323 and accompanying text (noting the database launched in March 2011);
see also CPSC's Product Safety Information Database, SAFER PRODUCTS,
http://www.saferproducts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2012) (CPSC database launched on March 11,
2011 for reporting harmful products).
376. The BBB has been active in handling consumers' escalating complaints against cellular
phone companies. See US BBB 2009 Statistics Sorted by Complaint, BETTER BUS. BUREAU,
http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/16/documents/stats%20pdflus-complaint.pdf (last visited Jan. 1,
2012); US BBB 2008 Statistics Sorted by Complaints, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/
us/storage/16/documents/stats%20pdf/usby complaint_2008_inter.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2012);
US BBBs Sorted by Complaint 2007, BETTER BUS. BUREAU, http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/0/
shared%20documents/complaintstats/stat2007/us-bycomplaint_2007.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
377. Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 657-59 (noting research suggesting that
constraints on communication modes may reduce gender bias).
378. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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It is no surprise that the BBB has used ODR processes. As noted above,
the Internet has opened new avenues for consumers to share purchase and
product information, and to assert complaints through ODR mechanisms
such as that administered through TRUSTe.379 When properly regulated to
ensure impartiality and fair procedures, such mechanisms may ease cost,
time, and bias concerns inherent in F2F dispute resolution. 380 Online
processes may also dispel the stresses of seeking assistance by providing a
structured, text-based means for communicating needs. 38' They also may
give companies more accurate feedback and better information regarding
their practices and products.382
In addition, expanded use of ODR that provides a binding award (online
arbitration, or what I term "OArb") may be especially effective for quick
resolution of consumer claims.383 While ODR that facilitates voluntary
agreements is laudable, it often is unsuccessful in the wake of disputes. By
requiring parties to commit to submitting disputes to binding arbitration,
OArb prevents parties from allowing anger or delay tactics to waylay
resolution and thus access to remedies. OArb also may be more satisfactory
and productive than non-binding processes because parties participate
knowing that it will end in a final determination.
Nonetheless, OArb commitment must be voluntary and properly
regulated to ensure fairness.385 F2F arbitration has earned a poor reputation
for curbing consumer and employee rights due to pro-business procedures
379. See supra text accompanying notes 367-68.
380. Stuhlmacher & Walters, supra note 131, at 659 (noting studies showing that CMC eases
communication bias by reducing social cues and subconscious propensities present in F2F
communications).
381. See Jelle van Veenen, From :-( to :-): Using Online Communication to Improve Dispute
Resolution 1-20 (Tilburg Inst. for Interdisciplinary Studies of Civil Law & Conflict Resolution Sys.,
Working Paper No. 002/2010, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1618719 (noting how
online communications can improve dispute resolution).
382. See supra notes 362-70 and accompanying text (noting the benefits of ODR).
383. OArb differs from other ODR because it results in a final third-party determination without
the cost and stress of traditional litigation. See Schmitz, supra note 327 (proposing expansion of
OArb).
384. See id. at 193.
385. See David J. Bilinsky, 10 Collaborative Principles for Leading a Successful ODR System
Initiative, ODR & CONSUMERS 2010 (Sept. 1, 2010), http://www.odrandconsumers20l0.org/
2010/09/01/10-collaborative-principles-for-leading-a-successful-odr-system-initiative (guest post by
Ben Ziegler) (providing tips for increasing confidence in e-commerce through ODR systems); David
J. Bilinsky, Implementation Consideration for ODR, ODR & CONSUMERS 2010 (Aug. 2, 2010),
http://www.odrandconsumers2010.org/2010/08/02/implementation-considerations-for-odr
(discussing best practices for ODR); Schmitz, supra note 327, at 235-40 (discussing fairness limits
and safety measures for OArb).
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and administration.386 Although it is questionable whether F2F arbitration
deserves this reputation, it is important to design and regulate neutral and
fair OArb procedures that will foster open-minded use of the process.
Accordingly, policymakers should capitalize on CMC's low cost, speed,
and accessibility.8 OArb policies should cap consumers' costs and set
strict time limits for companies to respond to complaints. Policies also
should allow for sufficient but properly limited discovery, and limit time on
evidentiary submissions and awards. Furthermore, arbitrators must be
neutral and properly trained, and have power to hold companies responsible
for failing to quickly comply with arbitration awards. Regulators should
then seek user feedback in order to foster continual system improvements. 3
OArb regulations also could mimic California's code provisions
requiring arbitration administrators to gather and post basic information
regarding consumer claims in an easily searchable format.3 90  This
information includes the names of companies involved, types of disputes,
prevailing parties, time from filing to disposition, claim and award amounts,
arbitrators' names, and other basic information not properly redacted as
confidential.39 1 Such postings help increase trust and transparency with
respect to the process, and uncover party and award patterns that would
suggest an arbitration administrator's bias for repeat-player companies who
continually use its services.392
At the same time, policymakers should promote neutral and user-
friendly means for consumers to safely "vent" and share information
386. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867-68 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that a class action ban in an arbitration agreement was unconscionable where it was likely to
preclude most consumers from seeking remedies on their small claims).
387. See Schmitz, supra note 327, at 226-44 (proposing regulated ODR for consumer complaint
resolution).
388. See supra text accompanying notes 367-68.
389. See Schmitz, supra note 327, at 226-44; see also Xu Junke, Development of ODR in China,
42 UCC L.J. 265, 265-72 (2010) (discussing ODR in China and the need for increased online trust
and consumer confidence to boost ODR processes and encourage "self-discipline" of e-commerce);
Colin Rule et al., Designing a Global Consumer Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) System for Cross-
Border Small Value-High Volume Claims-OAS Developments, 42 UCC L.J. 221 (2010), available
at http://colinrule.comlwriting/ucclj.pdf (discussing how to create a global system for resolving
consumer disputes and highlighting the United States' proposal for an ODR system). Full discussion
of ODR and OArb and means for expanding them in a measured manner is beyond the scope of this
Article, but further discussion may be found in Schmitz, supra note 327, at 177-244 (proposing
prudent expansion).
390. CAL. CIV.PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (2011).
391. Id.
392. Further research and policy discussions should nonetheless guide OArb's development. See
Rule et al., supra note 389, at 222-30. Debates on ODR have grown on global levels, and hold great
promise for consumer claims resolution. See ODR 2012, http://www.odr2012.org/nodepage=I (last
visited Jan. 1, 2012) (announcing the most recent ODR conference).
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regarding their purchase complaints.393 Consumers already connect, share
opinions, and spread information regarding company practices and products
on websites such as UCAN, noted above.3 94 The new CPSC database, also
noted above, is part of a larger technology upgrade aimed to provide
consumers and others with greater access to complaint information.39' The
New York Times and other news sources also maintain online columns for
voicing consumer complaints and seeking assistance.396
Consumers have power to prompt corporate changes. For example,
Facebook retracted onerous changes to its privacy standards after users
joined forces on the Internet to complain.9 Similarly, Musikpitch, a
company that facilitates custom song commissions for television and
movies, changed its terms in the wake of users' complaints about the terms'
requirement that songwriters transfer ownership of their songs to the
company.3 98 Musikpitch ultimately appeased users by no longer assuming
ownership of song rights, and instead allowing users to choose between one
of three sets of terms and conditions. 99
Nonetheless, policy initiatives may be necessary to combat cyber
bullying, dehumanization, and anti-normative behavior on the Internet.400
Organizations that host blogs and review websites should monitor postings
to preclude abusive or false comments.401 Furthermore, regulations should
393. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
394. See UCAN, http://www.ucan.org (last visited Oct. 8, 2011); see also supra note 359 and
accompanying text (discussing postings and advice on UCAN's website).
395. See Iffy Product, supra note 319, at 16-17 (discussing the database that debuted on March
11, 2011, pursuant to a law passed in 2008).
396. See, e.g., David Segal, Scammed? Rebuffed? Ignored? Read On, N.Y. TIMES (May 10,
2009), http://nytimes.com/2009/05/10/your-money/10haggler.html (regular column, The Haggler);
David Segal, The Refund That Circled Before Landing, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2009),
http://nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09haggler.html (regular column, The Haggler, noting the
first anniversary of the column, and responding to consumers' submitted questions and complaints).
397. Justin Smith, Facebook Reverts Terms of Service After Complaints, INSIDE FACEBOOK, (Feb.
18, 2009), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2009/02/18/facebook-reverts-terms-of-service-after-
complaints (explaining how consumer protests forced Facebook to ultimately revert to its old terms
while it rewrote more consumer-friendly privacy terms).
398. Bruce Houghton, MusikPitch Responds to Complaints, Revises Terms, HYPEBOT.COM,
http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2010/05/musikpitch-responds-to-complaints-revises-terms.htm
(last visited Jan. 1, 2012).
399. See id.
400. See van Veenen, supra note 381, at 20-23 (discussing how online communications may
actually heighten adherence to social norms, reduce the stress of F2F communication, and allow for
emotive communications).
401. Charles Starmer-Smith, Tripadvisor Reviews: Can We Trust Them?, TELEGRAPH (London)
(Oct. 20, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/hotels/8050127/Tripadvisor-reviews-can-we-
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bar companies from disingenuously promoting their products and services
by paying for positive reviews or posting fake reviews ("flogging") on blogs
and review sites. 402
Website controllers and administrators must adopt policies aimed to
protect the integrity and utility of website discussions. Information-sharing
mechanisms do not enhance consumer education or inform purchase
practices when postings are not trustworthy. Website controllers should be
responsible for verifying that reviewers have actually purchased the
reviewed goods or services, and allow businesses to respond to
complaints.403 Although controls should not overly infringe on free speech,
they should curtail the tone of comments from crossing the line to abuse.
Policymakers should also establish means for certifying sites that consumers
can rely on for solid purchasing advice.
Still, efforts should continue toward development of remedies for those
who lack Internet services due to location or other resource limitations.
Non-Internet media should remain available to provide consumer
information and access to remedies. Local news channels already do
"special investigations" that inform consumers about company improprieties
and prompt policy changes. For example, a local news channel's special
investigation inspired a Colorado tanning salon to provide relief to
consumers who felt cheated by fine print in the salon's terms that precluded
customers from canceling without paying fifty percent of the remaining
balance on their one or two year contracts.404 The television report became
the squeaky wheel for the otherwise myopic majority, and allowed
consumers to obtain relief from shrouded contract terms.
In sum, these are merely reform ideas to build on. Furthermore, reforms
should increase consumers' awareness and remedy resources without
increasing litigation or government oversight that will augment public and
private costs. For example, the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) established under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) should be careful in establishing
trust-them.html (discussing fake and spiteful reviews that severely impact businesses, despite the
reviews' lack of verification).
402. Lisa Thomas & Robert Newman, Social Networking and Blogging: The New Legal Frontier,
9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 500, 516-17 (2009) (providing examples of companies
faking reviews); Mark Balnaves & James Mahoney, Editorial, The Illusion of Control in Public
Relations, PUB. REL. RESOURCE CENTER, http://www.prismjournal.org/global.html (last visited Nov.
14, 2011) (also discussing companies covert schemes); Starmer-Smith, supra note 401 (discussing
purchase reviews posted on the popular travel review site).
403. Starmer-Smith, supra note 401 (discussing the importance of proper monitoring and noting
how eBay and Apple have had success in limiting reviews to those of verified customers).
404. Heidi Hermnmat, Complaints Prompt Changes 'At the Beach,' KDVR, FOx 31 DENVER (Dec.
17, 2009), http://www.kdvr.comfnews/kdvr-at-the-beach-folo-121709,0,4746023.story (describing
how a Fox 31 News investigation caused the salon to offer a "courtesy cancellation" to the customer
who complained).
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consumer protections aimed to end lending abuses.405 The Bureau may be
wise to promulgate regulations that promote use of low-cost CMC to
establish and inform consumers about accessible complaint-processing
mechanisms with respect to the goods and services they sell.
Transparent and accessible remedy mechanisms are essential to prevent
the SWS from perpetuating contractual discrimination and remedy rationing
that thrives in low-information environments. However, this does not
require complicated disclosures that lead to information overload. Instead,
companies could provide customers with a simple chart stating who to
contact regarding complaints, and how the complaint processing works. In
addition, the CFPB or an independent organization comprised of consumer
and industry leaders could gather and centrally post this information with
respect to all companies on a searchable website.406 This central listing
could dovetail with the database proposed above for compiling legitimate
complaints asserted against companies and the remedies provided. Such
transparency should spark companies to improve their complaint handling
processes, and help empower consumers to pursue legitimate complaints and
protect their rights regardless of status.
V. CONCLUSION
Consumers should benefit from exerting resources to pursue their
purchase complaints, and companies often have benign motives in assisting
the squeaky wheel customers. However, the SWS also impedes market
regulation of business practices and fosters contractual discrimination.407
The SWS allows companies to ration consumer remedies and benefits by
quietly reserving them for only the relatively few proactive consumers who
405. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). See also Consumer Financial
Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposed bill to establish an agency
to regulate consumer financial products and services and authorizing the agency to approve pilot
programs for effective disclosure of consumer contract terms); Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureaul (last visited Jan. 1, 2012). But
see David S. Evans & Joshua D. Wright, How the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of
2009 Would Change the Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial Products, BLOOMBERG L.
REP.: RISK & COMPLIANCE, Oct. 2009, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1491117 (critiquing the Dodd-Frank Act for advocating broad applications
without an adequate evidentiary basis).
406. A full discussion of the options is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Article
seeks to spark discussion and creative ideas for educating and empowering consumers in the most
efficient and effective manner-which may be through public or private means.
407. See supra Part III.A.
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have the requisite knowledge and resources to remain persistent in pursuing
their rights.408 This leaves the majority without benefits they may deserve.
It also hinders the informed squeaky wheels from sharing their knowledge,
and thus the available benefits, with the majority.i" These proactive
consumers therefore fail to fulfill the role of the so-called informed minority,
who economists propose will spread information and police contract
fairness.410
Accordingly, policymakers should work with businesses and consumers
to expand and equalize consumers' access to information and assistance with
respect to their purchase rights.411 This should begin with use of low-cost
online mechanisms to raise awareness regarding contract rights and
remedies, and to create accessible claims procedures designed to diffuse the
SWS. Furthermore, companies should expand ODR and OArb for
consumers to obtain redress on their legitimate purchase complaints. In
addition, the CFPB or an independent organization could assist in these
efforts with an aim toward empowering consumers to protect their rights






See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
[Vol. 39: 279, 2012] Squeaky Wheel System
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Appendix A. Demographic Information.
Age
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
18-24 yrs. old 19 6.2 6.2 6.2
25-29 yrs. old 16 5.2 5.2 11.4
30-39 yrs. old 40 13.1 13.1 24.5
40-49 yrs. old 73 23.9 23.9 48.4
Valid
50-59 yrs. old 81 26.5 26.5 74.8
60-69 yrs. old 54 17.6 17.6 92.5
70 yrs. or over 23 7.5 7.5 100
Total 306 100 100
Household Income
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
less than $20,000 43 14.1 17.1 17.1
$20,000-$29,999 33 10.8 13.1 30.3
$30,000-$39,999 43 14.1 17.1 47.4
$40,000-$49,999 32 10.5 12.7 60.2
$50,000-$59,999 22 7.2 8.8 68.9
Valid $60,000-$74,999 26 8.5 10.4 79.3
$75,000-$99,999 24 7.8 9.6 88.8
$100,000- 23 7.5 9.2 98$149,999
$150,000+ 5 1.6 2 100
Total 251 82 100





Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
single, never married 58 19 19 19
married 150 49 49 68
Valid separated/divorced/ 75 24.5 24.5 92.5
widowed
domestic partnership 23 7.5 7.5 100
Total 306 100 100
Employment Status
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
full-time 129 42.2 42.2 42.2
part-time 49 16 16 58.2
Valid
not employed 128 41.8 41.8 100
Total 306 100 100
Education Level
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
some HS 5 1.6 1.6 1.6
HS graduate 34 11.1 11.1 12.7
some college 135 44.1 44.1 56.9
college degree 78 25.5 25.5 82.4
Valid some postgrad 17 5.6 5.6 87.9
master's degree 27 8.8 8.8 96.7
Ph.D./law/prof 10 3.3 3.3 100
degree
Total 306 100 100
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Respondent Occupation
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
exec./upper mgmt. 12 3.9 4.5 4.5
IT/MIS professional 11 3.6 4.1 8.6
doctor/surgeon 2 0.7 0.7 9.4
educator 11 3.6 4.1 13.5
Valid homemaker 33 10.8 12.4 25.8
student 13 4.2 4.9 30.7
none of above 168 54.9 62.9 93.6
small business owner 17 5.6 6.4 100
Total 267 87.3 100




_ _ _ -ec P n Valid CumulativeJFrequency Pcent Percent Percent
unspecified 45 14.7 14.7 14.7
other 6 2 2 16.7
Hispanic 6 2 2 18.6
multi: Hispanic/other 2 0.7 0.7 19.3
Pacific Islander 2 0.7 0.7 19.9
Indian 2 0.7 0.7 20.6
multi: Hispanic/Indian 1 0.3 0.3 20.9
Asian 3 1 1 21.9
black 2 0.7 0.7 22.5
white 228 74.5 74.5 97.1
multi: white/other 1 0.3 0.3 97.4
multi: white/Hispanic 4 1.3 1.3 98.7
multi:
white/Pacific/Hispanic 1 0.3 0.3 99
multi: white/Indian 2 0.7 0.7 99.7
multi:
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Appendix B. S2Q8: Think broadly about how fair (using your own sense of
'fairness') you view different contracts and purchase terms, regardless of
whether you have relevant personal experiences. Please indicate how fair you
view the following terms.
Gym Memberships
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
completely fair 12 3.9 4 4
usually fair 80 26.1 26.9 31
neutral 118 38.6 39.7 70.7
Valid
usually unfair 74 24.2 24.9 95.6
completely unfair 13 4.2 4.4 100
Total 297 97.1 100
Missing System 9 2.9
Total 306 100
Company Standard Form Contracts/Purchase Terms
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
completely fair 8 2.6 2.7 2.7
usually fair 164 53.6 55.2 57.9
neutral 102 33.3 34.3 92.3
Valid
usually unfair 20 6.5 6.7 99
completely unfair 3 1 1 100
Total 297 97.1 100
Missing System 9 2.9
Total 306 100
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Employment Contracts and Handbooks
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
completely fair 34 11.1 11.4 11.4
usually fair 170 55.6 57 68.5
neutral 73 23.9 24.5 93
Valid
usually unfair 14 4.6 4.7 97.7
completely unfair 7 2.3 2.3 100
Total 298 97.4 100




Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
completely fair 24 7.8 8.1 8.1
usually fair 132 43.1 44.4 52.5
neutral 86 28.1 29 81.5
Valid
usually unfair 46 15 15.5 97
completely unfair 9 2.9 3 100
Total 297 97.1 100
Missing System 9 2.9
r- Total 306 100
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Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
completely fair 19 6.2 6.4 6.4
usually fair 134 43.8 45 51.3
neutral 94 30.7 31.5 82.9
Valid
usually unfair 41 13.4 13.8 96.6
completely unfair 10 3.3 3.4 100
Total 298 97.4 100




Frequency Percent 11.4 11.7a9Percent Percent
completely fair 19 6.2 6.4 6.4
usually fair 152 49.7 51 57.4
neutral 80 26.1 26.8 84.2
Vld usually unfair 35 11.4 11.7 96
completely unfair 12 3.9 4 100
Total 298 97.4 100
Missing System 8 2.6
Total 306 100
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Credit Card Contracts or Terms
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
completely fair 18 5.9 6.1 6.1
usually fair 98 32 33 39.1
neutral 78 25.5 26.3 65.3
Valid
usually unfair 84 27.5 28.3 93.6
completely unfair 19 6.2 6.4 100
Total 297 97.1 100




Frequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
completely fair 12 3.9 4.1 4.1
usually fair 120 39.2 40.5 44.6
neutral 139 45.4 47 91.6
Valid
usually unfair 19 6.2 6.4 98
completely unfair 6 2 2 100
Total 296 96.7 100
Missing System 10 3.3
Total 306 100
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Warranties
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
completely fair 24 7.8 8.1 8.1
usually fair 160 52.3 53.9 62
neutral 73 23.9 24.6 86.5
Valid
usually unfair 37 12.1 12.5 99
completely unfair 3 1 1 100
Total 297 97.1 100
Missing System 9 2.9
Total 306 100
Cell Phone Contracts
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
completely fair 16 5.2 5.4 5.4
usually fair 94 30.7 31.8 37.2
neutral 83 27.1 28 65.2
Valid
usually unfair 83 27.1 28 93.2
completely unfair 20 6.5 6.8 100
Total 296 96.7 100




Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
completely fair 26 8.5 8.8 8.8
usually fair 92 30.1 31.2 40
neutral 151 49.3 51.2 91.2
Valid
usually unfair 15 4.9 5.1 96.3
completely unfair 11 3.6 3.7 100
Total 295 96.4 100
Missing System 11 3.6
Total 306 100
Contracts with Family
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
completely fair 34 11.1 11.6 11.6
usually fair 87 28.4 29.6 41.2
neutral 146 47.7 49.7 90.8
Valid
usually unfair 18 5.9 6. 1 96.9
completely unfair 9 2.9 3.1 100
Total 294 96.1 100
Missing System 12 3.9
Total 306 100
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Dispute or Claim Settlement Agreements
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
completely fair 17 5.6 5.8 5.8
usually fair 79 25.8 26.9 32.7
neutral 131 42.8 44.6 77.2
Valid
usually unfair 60 19.6 20.4 97.6
completely unfair 7 2.3 2.4 100
Total 294 96.1 100
Missing System 12 3.9
Total 306 100
Appendix C. S3Q6: Now think generally about any complaints or disputes you
have had regarding consumer purchases ofproducts or services. What, if any,
terms have you found to be important at some point with respect to a complaint
or dispute? Check all that apply.
Price
Frequency Percent Valid CumulativePercent Percent
no 245 80.1 80.1 80.1
Valid yes 61 19.9 19.9 100
Total 306 100 100
Warranties
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 132 43.1 43.1 43.1
Valid yes 174 56.9 56.9 100




Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 192 62.7 62.7 62.7
Valid yes 114 37.3 37.3 100
Total 306 100 100
Interest Rate for Credit Payments
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 240 78.4 78.4 78.4
Valid yes 66 21.6 21.6 100
Total 306 100 100
Returning Items
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 153 50 50 50
Valid yes 153 50 50 100
Total 306 100 100
Cancelling Services
*Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 163 53.3 53.3 53.3
Valid yes 143 46.7 46.7 100
Total 306 100 100
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Arbitration Requirements
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 271 88.6 88.6 88.6
Valid yes 35 11.4 11.4 100
Total 306 100 100
Freebies/Incentives
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 279 91.2 91.2 91.2
Valid yes 27 8.8 8.8 100
Total 306 100 100
Disclaimers/Waivers of Liability
Frequency Percent Valid CumulativePercent Percent
no 252 82.4 82.4 82.4
Valid yes 54 17.6 17.6 100
Total 306 100 100
Other (yes/no)
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 299 97.7 97.7 97.7
Valid yes 7 2.3 2.3 100
Total 306 100 100
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Appendix D. S3Q1: Now focus again on your consumer purchases and the form
contracts or purchase terms you encounter when buying consumer products and
services. Roughly, how often do you try to negotiate or change such form
contracts or terms when you purchase consumer products or services?
How Often You Chanee Contracts or Terms
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
never 115 37.6 38 38
rarely 83 27.1 27.4 65.3
sometimes 65 21.2 21.5 86.8
Valid half the time 14 4.6 4.6 91.4
frequently 19 6.2 6.3 97.7
nearly all the 7 2.3 2.3 100time
Total 303 99 100
Missing System 3 1
Total 306 100
Appendix E. S3Q1: Cross-tabulated with Gender.
How Often You Change Contracts or Terms x Gender
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Appendix F. S3Q1A: If you have tried to change form terms,
have you been able to get the terms changed when you tried?
How Often You Successfully Change Terms
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
never 24 7.8 13.2 13.2
rarely 54 17.6 29.7 42.9
sometimes 53 17.3 29.1 72
Valid half the time 22 7.2 12.1 84.1
frequently 22 7.2 12.1 96.2
nearly all the 7 2.3 3.8 100
time
Total 182 59.5 100
Missing System 124 40.5
Total 306 100
Appendix G. S3Q1B: What types of terms have you been able to get changed in
form contracts? Check all that apply:
Price
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 195 63.7 63.7 63.7
Valid yes 111 36.3 36.3 100
Total 306 100 100
Warranties
I Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 265 86.6 86.6 86.6
Valid yes 41 13.4 13.4 100




j - Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 245 80.1 80.1 80.1
Valid yes 61 19.9 19.9 100
Total 306 100 100
Interest Rate for Credit Payments
_______Percen Cumulative
Frequency Percent erC ePercent Percent
no 260 85 85 85
Valid yes 46 15 15 100
Total 306 100 100
Terms for Returning
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 266 86.9 86.9 86.9
Valid yes 40 13.1 13.1 100
Total 306 100 100
Terms for Cancelling Services
Frequency Per Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
no 274 89.5 89.5 89.5
Valid yes 32 10.5 10.5 100
Total 306 100 100
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Terms for Arbitration Claims
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 299 97.7 97.7 97.7
Valid yes 7 2.3 2.3 100
Total 306 100 100
Terms for Incentives
I Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 270 88.2 88.2 88.2
Valid yes 36 11.8 11.8 100
Total 306 100 100
Disclaimers/Waivers of Liability
Valid ICumulative
Frequency Percent _ _
Percent Percent
no 289 94.4 94.4 94.4
Valid yes 17 5.6 5.6 100
Total 306 100 100
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Appendix H. S2Q6: Now think generally about purchase terms that sellers
provide in a standard form. Again, as described at the start ofPart II, these
form terms may be provided at a store, in the mail, in or on product packaging,
or on the seller's Web site on the Internet. With this in mind, indicate your level
of agreement with the following statements about such form terms.
Assume Cannot Change
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
strongly 88 28.8 28.9 28.9
agree
somewhat 114 37.3 37.4 66.2
agree
neutral 57 18.6 18.7 84.9
Valid somewhat 32 10.5 10.5 95.4
disagree
strongly 14 4.6 4.6 100disagree
Total 305 99.7 100
Missing System 1 0.3
Total 306 100
Waste of Time to Read
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
strongly 4 1.3 1.3 1.3
agree
somewhat 22 7.2 7.2 8.6
agree
neutral 62 20.3 20.4 28.9
Valid somewhat 82 26.8 27 55.9
disagree
strongly 134 43.8 44.1 100disagree
Total 304 99.3 100
Missing System 2 0.7
Total 306 100
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Very Important to Read
Frequency Percent Valid Cumulative
Perce-t Percept
strongly 139 45.4 45.7 45.7
agree
somewhat 102 33.3 33.6 79.3
agree
neutral 50 16.3 16.4 95.7
somewhat 9 2.9 3 98.7disagree
strongly 4 1.3 1.3 100disagree
Total 304 99.3 100
Missing System 2 0.7
Total 306 100
Don't See Why I Should Read
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
strongly 3 1 1 1
agree
somewhat 17 5.6 5.6 6.6
agree
Valid neutral 58 19 19.1 25.7
somewhat 89 29.1 29.3 54.9disagree
strongly 137 44.8 45.1 100disagree
Total 304 99.3 100
Missing System 2 0.7
Total 306 100
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Read Since Having a Purchase Problem
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
strongly 15 4.9 4.9 4.9
agree
somewhat 79 25.8 25.9 30.8
agree
Valid neutral 79 25.8 25.9 56.7
somewhat 79 25.8 25.9 82.6disagree
strongly 53 17.3 17.4 100disagree
Total 305 99.7 100
Missing System 1 0.3
Total 306 100
Only Read After a Problem With That Purchase
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
strongly 8 2.6 2.6 2.6
agree
somewhat 49 16 16.1 18.8
agree
Valid neutral 54 17.6 17.8 36.5
somewhat 86 28.1 28.3 64.8
disagree
strongly 107 35 35.2 100disagree
Total 304 99.3 100
Missing System 2 0.7
Total 306 100
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Appendix I. S3Q4: Now think broadly about your purchases generally. How
often have you read contract or purchase terms covering a consumer product or
service for the first time only after complaints or disputes arose about the
product or service?
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
never 34 11.1 11.4 11.4
rarely 87 28.4 29.2 40.6
sometimes 66 21.6 22.1 62.8
half the time 37 12.1 12.4 75.2
Valid frequently 25 8.2 8.4 83.6
nearly all the 22 7.2 7.4 90.9time
n/a; never had
a complaint or 27 8.8 9.1 100
dispute
Total 298 97.4 100
Missing System 8 2.6
Total 306 100
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Appendix J. S3Q5: How often have you gone back to review terms you had
previously read or skimmed because of a complaint or dispute?
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
never 16 5.2 5.4 5.4
rarely 69 22.5 23.2 28.5
sometimes 99 32.4 33.2 61.7
half the time 26 8.5 8.7 70.5
Valid frequently 46 15 15.4 85.9
nearly all the 16 5.2 5.4 91.3
time
n/a; never had
a complaint or 26 8.5 8.7 100
dispute
Total 298 97.4 100
Missing System 8 2.6
Total 306 100
Appendix K. S3Q3: Imagine that you are shopping for a car and have found the
one you think you want. The salesperson gives you afive page contract with
purchase terms, and asks you to sign it in order to finalize the purchase. Please
review the list ofpurchase terms below, and check all the terms that you would
want the salesperson to explain to you.
Explain Price
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 84 27.5 27.5 27.5
Valid yes 222 72.5 72.5 100
Total 306 100 100
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Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 24 7.8 7.8 7.8
Valid yes 282 92.2 92.2 100
Total 306 100 100
Explain Fees/Penalties
Frequency Percent Valid CumulativePercent Percent
no 49 16 16 16
Valid yes 257 84 84 100
Total 306 100 100
Explain Interest Rate for Payments
F Valid Cumulative
Percent Percent
no 76 24.8 24.8 24.8
Valid yes 230 75.2 75.2 100
Total 306 100 100
Explain Terms for Return
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 73 23.9 23.9 23.9
Valid yes 233 76.1 76.1 100




Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 135 44.1 44.1 44.1
Valid yes 171 55.9 55.9 100
Total 306 100 100
Explain Freebies/Incentives
II Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 157 51.3 51.3 51.3
Valid yes 149 48.7 48.7 100
Total 306 100 100
Explain Disclaimers/Liability Waivers
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 76 24.8 24.8 24.8
Valid yes 230 75.2 75.2 100
Total 306 100 100
Explain Boilerplate
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 179 58.5 58.5 58.5
Valid yes 127 41.5 41.5 100
Total 306 100 100
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Explain Technical/Legal Words
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 122 39.9 39.9 39.9
Valid yes 184 60.1 60.1 100
Total 306 100 100
Explain Other (yes/no)
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
no 300 98 98 98
Valid yes 6 2 2 100
Total 306 100 100
No Terms Explained
Frequency Percent Valid CumulativePercent Percent
no 301 98.4 98.4 98.4
Valid yes 5 1.6 1.6 100
Total 306 100 100
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Appendix L. S1 Q3: When you do "shop around" or compare choices, what
leads you to make final purchasing decisions? Think about the factors below,
and indicate how important each of the factors generally is to you in deciding
what to buy.
Personal Relationship to Seller
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
very important 35 11.4 11.6 11.6
somewhat 88 28.8 29 40.6
important
Valid minor 114 37.3 37.6 78.2importance
not important 66 21.6 21.8 100
Total 303 99 100
Missing System 3 1
Total 306 100
Brand/Label
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
very important 43 14.1 14.1 14.1
somewhat 174 56.9 57.2 71.4
important
Valid minor 65 21.2 21.4 92.8importance
not important 22 7.2 7.2 100
Total 304 99.3 100
Missing System 2 0.7
Total 306 100
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Store Reputation
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
very important 101 33 33.4 33.4
somewhat 153 50 50.7 84.1
important
Valid minor 41 13.4 13.6 97.7importance
not important 7 2.3 2.3 100
Total 302 98.7 100
Missing System 4 1.3
Total 306 100
Financing Options/Interest Rates
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
very important 161 52.6 53.3 53.3
somewhat 76 24.8 25.2 78.5
important
Valid mminor 29 9.5 9.6 88.1importance
not important 36 11.8 11.9 100
Total 302 98.7 100
Missing System 4 1.3
Total 306 100
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Contract Terms/Conditions Other Than Price
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
very important 164 53.6 53.9 53.9
somewhat 99 32.4 32.6 86.5
important
Valid minor 26 8.5 8.6 95.1importance
not important 15 4.9 4.9 100
Total 304 99.3 100
Missing System 2 0.7
Total 306 100
Just Want It
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
very important 48 15.7 15.9 15.9
somewhat 123 40.2 40.7 56.6
important
Valid minor 100 32.7 33.1 89.7importance
not important 31 10.1 10.3 100
Total 302 98.7 100
Missing System 4 1.3
Total 306 100
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Friend/Family Recommendations
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
very important 43 14.1 14.1 14.1
somewhat 154 50.3 50.7 64.8important
Valid minor 87 28.4 28.6 93.4importance
not important 20 6.5 6.6 100
Total 304 99.3 100
Missing System 2 0.7
Total 306 100
Consumer Reviews
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
very important 66 21.6 21.7 21.7
somewhat 138 45.1 45.4 67.1important
Valid minor 83 27.1 27.3 94.4importance
not important 17 5.6 5.6 100
Total 304 99.3 100





Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
very important 39 12.7 12.9 12.9
somewhat 124 40.5 40.9 53.8
important
Valid minor 98 32 32.3 86.1importance
not important 42 13.7 13.9 100
Total 303 99 100
Missing System 3 1
Total 306 100
Price
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C e
Percent Percent
very important 236 77.1 77.9 77.9
somewhat 65 21.2 21.5 99.3
importantValid miompor 2 0.7 0.7 100
importance
Total 303 99 100
Missing System 3 1
Total 306 100
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Friendly Salesperson
Valid CumulativeFrequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
very important 61 19.9 20.1 20.1
somewhat 149 48.7 49.2 69.3important
Valid minor 79 25.8 26.1 95.4importance
not important 14 4.6 4.6 100
Total 303 99 100
Missing System 3 1
Total 306 100
Appendix M. S3Q7: Had you seen or noticed anything about "arbitration" in
any consumer purchase contract or terms?
Valid Cumulative
Frequency Percent Peren C ePercent Percent
no 151 49.3 50.5 50.5
Valid yes 148 48.4 49.5 100
Total 299 97.7 100
Missing System 7 2.3
Total 306 100
363
0 ~ 0 0 v
Cl C)
000
000 0 C> 0 = c
(2, C0r- = 7 00 W












00 . v Cl CC) Cl~
t0 0a ;7 0

















q q (- 0 CD O
0D C> 000 0
000
0 9 00
- o o 0 C
) 0) 0) 0) 0) 00
ol q 0 0 0 0I0T
CD 0 0 0
0 C 0 C 000 0
oZ A 0 D 0)4M 0 0 00 o-
0 0 0r
0 0E
o ~ ~ ~ ~ o 1 0 (M
365
Appendix 0. S1Q3H How important one views friend/family recommendations
cross-tabulated with gender
Gender Total
male female I_ I
very
important
Count 11 32 43
% within S1Q3H
purchase factors: 25.60% 74.40% 100.00%friend/family
recommendation
% within Gender 10.80% 15.80% 14.10%
% of Total 3.60% 10.50% 14.10%
Count 47 107 154
% within S1Q3H
somewhat purchase factors: 30.50% 69.50% 100.00%friend/family
important recommendation
% within Gender 46.10% 53.00% 50.70%
% of Total 15.50% 35.20% 50.70%
Count 34 53 87
% within S lQ3H
minor purchase factors: 39.10% 60.90% 100.00%friend/family
importance recommendation
% within Gender 33.30% 26.20% 28.60%
% of Total 11.20% 17.40% 28.60%
not
important
Count 10 10 20
% within S1Q3H
purchase factors: 50.00% 50.00% 100.00%friend/family
recommendation
% within Gender 9.80% 5.00% 6.60%
% of Total 3.30% 3.30% 6.60%
Count 102 202 304
% within S1Q3H
purchase factors: 33.60% 66.40% 100.00%
Total friend/family
recommendation
% within Gender 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
% of Total 33.60% 66.40% 100.00%
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SlQ3H
purchase
factors:
friend/family
recommen-
dation
